TOREIGN 
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UC-NRLF 


B    2    LIE   b3fl 


BRANDENBURG  AND  THE  ENGLISH 
REVOLUTION  OF  1688 


INAUGURAL -DISSERTATION 


ZUR  ERLANGUNG  DER 


PHILOSOPHISCHEN    DOCTORWURDE 


VORGELEGT  DER  HOHEN 


PHILOSOPHISCHEN  FACULTAT 


DER    UNIVERSITAT    FREIBURG  i.  B, 


I.    By^xJl^^^'O-fft^^'-Wj 


VON 


HAROLD  LEEJCIN! 

AUS  OBERUN.  OHIO 


OBERLIN 

1914 


UNIVERSITY  Ot  CALirURNiA  LiBRAJRX 


ABBREVIATIONS 

B.  St.  A.  Konigliches  Geheimes  Staatsarchiv  in  Berlin. 

H.  R.  A.  Algemeen  Rijksarchief  in  the  Hague. 

K.  H.  A.  Koninklijk  Huisarchief  in  the  Hague. 

L.  R.  O.  Public  Record  Office  in  London. 

Avaux  Avaux,  Negotiations  en  Hollande. 

Cavelli  Campana  de  Cavelli,  Les  derniers  Stuarts  a  St. 

Germain-en-Laye. 

Dalrymple      Sir  John  Dalrymple,  Memoirs  of  Great  Britain 
and  Ireland. 


Haake  P.  Haake,  Brandenburgische  Politik  und  Krieg- 

fiihrung. 

Miiller  P.   L.    Muller,   Wilhelm   HI   von    Oranien   und 

Georg  Friedrich  von  Waldeck. 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2008  with  funding  from 

IVIicrosoft  Corporation 


http://www.archive.org/details/brandenburgengliOOkingrich 


The  treaties  of  the  years  1678  and  1679,  which  together 
form  the  Peace  of  Nymegen,  placed  a  period  to  the  second 
European  war  of  Louis  XIV,  and  left  him,  for  a  time,  all  but 
dictator  in  Europe.  The  old  alliances  against  France  were 
shattered ;  and  several  years  intervened  before  the  new  system 
grew  dangerous.  Even  then  their  proper  development  hung 
by  slender  threads,  until  after  the  actual  outbreak  of  hostilities. 
Only  two  points  were  certain;  the  ambitions  of  Louis  must, 
sooner  or  later,  bring  on  further  warfare,  and  William  of 
Orange  would  be  a  leader  among  his  opponents.  He,  in  spite 
of  all  the  incidents  and  results  of  his  career,  seems  often  to 
stand  for  opposition  to  Louis,  and  for  little  else.  This  is  true 
both  politically  and  personally,  and  may  be  explained,  in  part, 
by  his  clear  reading  of  the  European  situation,  combined  with 
the  fact  that  he  had  no  heirs  of  his  bodv.  With  this  exception 
there  was  hardly  a  prince,  or  state,  whose  position  at  any  future 
time  could  be  definitely  counted  upon.  The  Emperor  was 
absorbed  in  his  Turkish  conquests.  The  experience,  gained 
during  a  reign  of  constant  danger  and  poverty,  hardly  saved 
Frederick  William  from  being  carried  away  on  the  wings 
of  his  vision,  the  vision  of  the  Prussia  which  Frederick  the 
Great  was  to  use.  Denmark  and  Sweden,  Wittelsbach,  Wettin, 
Welf,  and  Stewart,  all  had  their  separate  ambitions.  All  were 
under  the  immediate  influence  of  the  example  of  Louis  XIV, 
and  it  was  probably  a  very  old,  or  very  weak  ruler,  who  did 
not  dream  of  following  some  little  distance  along  a  like  road. 
Alliances  and  cross  alliances  were  numerous,  for  there  were 
many  powers,  large  and  small,  waxing  and  waning,  each  with 
more  or  less  definite  plans  and  hopes.     Each  knew  that  the 


struggle  must  break  out  again,  but  not  where  the  balance  of 
interests  would  lead  them.  In  the  midst  of  the  resulting:  tan.ele 
of  treaties,  negotiations,  and  quarrels,  Brandenburg  was  pe- 
culiarly in  a  position  to  exercise  decisive  influence. 

Humanly  speaking,  two  things  seemed  necessary  if  the 
allies  of  the  coming  war  were  to  be  sufficiently  formidable.  In 
the  first  place  England  must  be  brought  actively  into  opposi- 
tion to  France.  Because  of  the  g^reat  question  of  power  at 
sea,  and  in  order  to  remove  from  the  Netherlands  the  fear 
of  another  1672,^  even  a  neutral  England  was  practically  an 
ally  of  Louis  XIV.  Here  is  the  one  success  on  which  William 
felt  obliged  to  count.  Secondly,  as  this  came  more  and  more 
certainly  to  mean  the  expedition  of  1688,  the  attitude  of 
Brandenburg  became  directly  important.  Not  only  had  she 
been  the  most  vital  ally  of  Louis,  but  she  alone  could  offer 
the  desired  support  which  would  enable  Orange  to  go  to  Eng- 
land. Of  course,  ultimately,  the  Emperor  must  be  drawn 
again  to  the  West,  and  the  German  Princes,  with  Spain  and 
Savoy,  must,  in  so  far  as  possible,  be  brought  into  the  league.^ 

This  naked  analysis  does  not  mean  to  ignore  the  real 
complexity  of  the  situation,  but  merely  to  emphasize  the  essen- 
tial nature  of  the  relations  between  the  Elector  and  Orange. 
Especially  it  would  not  forget  either  that  William's  most 
necessary  support  was  from  the  Netherlands  and  the  revo- 
lutionists in  England,  or  that  the  real  reading  of  the  situation, 
the  "nunc  aut  numquam",  remained  with  him.  It  was  in  a 
very  real  sense  his  battle;  but,  just  because  the  basic  position 
of  Orange  was  no  more  in  doubt  than  that  of  Louis  himself, 
the  decision  of  the  Elector  became  decisive  in  shaping:  definite 
plans.     It  is,  for  instance,  of  no  importance  that  the  expedi- 


1  Pufendorf  "De  rebus  gestis  Friderici  III,"  Lib.  I  §  70. 

2  There  is  also  a  reason,  for  making  Brandenburg  the  center  of  the 
story,  in  the  fact  that  the  relations  with  Orange  and  the  Provinces  are 
really  the  central  feature  of  the  Brandenburg  policy  during  the  period, 
while  the  relations  with  Brandenburg  are  but  one  portion  of  the  policy 
of  Orange. 


tion  may  have  been  suggested  by  him,  for  it  could  not  have 
been  foreign  to  William's  mind,  the  real  point  being  that  the 
Elector  is  now  ready  to  talk  about  it. 

This  readiness  can  surely  be  dated  as  early  as  1685. 
To  date  it  earlier  is  merely  to  say  that  the  French  alliance 
was  never  more  than  a  passing  phase.  The  last  noticable 
event  of  1684  had  been  the  establishment  of  the  Twenty  Years 
Truce,  on  a  basis  which  appeared  to  promise  Louis  the  foun- 
dation of  a  permanent  preponderance.  The  alliance  between 
France  and  Brandenburg  seemed  strong,  and  there  ^vere 
grounds  for  hope  of  drawing  the  House  of  Brunswick  into 
the  French  system.  The  association  of  1681,  between  the 
Emperor,  Spain,  Sweden,  and  the  United  Provinces  had  shown 
no  signs  of  vigor.  The  alliance  of  1682  had  yet  to  reach  the 
meager  stature  of  the  Augsburg  Alliance.  But  in  1685  the 
change  is  evident.  The  offensive  of  Louis,  both  political  and 
religious,  had  reached  a  new  and  more  unbearable  stage.  Hi's 
real  hope  of  eft'ective  alliance  in  Germany  grew  less.  In  Eng- 
land James  soon  entered  the  road  towards  the  Revolution. 
Protestantism  seemed  in  greater  danger  than  since  the  death 
of  Wallenstein.  All  this  the  Elector  felt,  and  was  in  addition 
convinced  that  subsidies  were  the  only  positive  g-ain  to  be 
drawn  from  the  French  alliance.  Thus  came  his  last  p-reat 
change  of  front,  marked  outwardlv  bv  his  several  Quarrels 
with  France,  and  his  closer  relations  with  the  United  Provinces 
and  with  the  Emperor. 

Nor  is  his  ensuing  uncertainty  by  any  means  as  great,  as 
at  times  appears.  Of  his  final  policy  he  was  no  longer  in  doubt, 
but  there  were  reasons  for  appearing  doubtful,  among  them 
the  hope  of  securmg  as  many  French  subsidy  payments  as 
possible.  But  there  was  also  the  danger  of  a  premature  break 
with  France,  and  the  fact  that  he  could  do  much  to  hold  her 
in  diplomatic  play.  As  to  details  he  could  not  be  certain.  He 
may,  for  instance,  have  expected  the  war  to  break  out  earlier. 
When  he  seems  more  impatient  than  his  nephew,  it  may  be 
because,   partly  owing  to   inferior  information,   he   felt   that 


the  danger  to  English  Protestantism  was  too  real  to  allow  of 
much  delay.  It  may  be  that,  fearing  his  son's  weakness,  he 
hoped  to  reap  success  before  his  own  strength  failed.  But 
this  should  not  be  confused  with  uncertainty  as  to  his  main 
position. 

Certainly  the  Elector  appears,  in  one  way  or  another,  the 
central  point  in  much  of  the  most  important  business  of  these 
years.  Not  that  the  new  system  developed  without  interrup- 
tion. No  stratification  of  treaties  could  calm  all  the  quarrels 
which  might  arise.  Frederick  Wilhelm,  particularly,  found 
himself  in  frequent  difficulties  with  each  of  his  neighbors.^ 
The  delicacy  of  the  task  of  securing  both  Sweden  and  Denmark 
to  the  alliance  is  an  example  of  the  numerous  diplomatic  com- 
plications. Still  the  development,  tho  gradual  and  irregular, 
was  definite.  The  part  played  by  Frederick  William,  and  the 
importance  of  the  relations  with  William  and  the  Provinces, 
are  constantly  noticeable.  It  was  the  Elector  who  made  large, 
if  ill  considered,  sacrifices  in  the  hope  of  drawing  the  Haps- 
burg  power  more  speedily  to  the  West.  He  played  no  incon- 
siderable part  in  holding  the  northern  situation  in  check.  He 
thwarted,  where  possible,  the  negotiations  with  the  House  of 
Brunswick.  He  probably  did  something  to  counteract  the 
attempts,  of  Avaux  and  others,  to  increase  the  friction  between 
Orange  and  his  opponents  at  home.  If  he  still  had  many 
dreams,  the  plan  against  France,  for  both  political  and  personal 
reasons,  holds  the  foreground.  To  this  end  his  concert  with 
the  Netherlands  and  William  was  above  all  imperative. 

For  some  years  these  relations  had  seemed  to  signify  very 
little.  Then,  at  the  end  of  1684,  Diest  proposed  an  alliance 
in  the  name  of  Brandenburg.  The  Estates  refused  his  ad- 
vances, at  least  in  public,  tho  the  mission  of  Spaen  in  the 


1  Compare  Rebenac,  in  Urkunden  und  Akten,  XX,  p.  1092,  "Cest, 
Sire,  le  genie  naturel  de  cette  cour  d'etablir  des  pretentions  sur  toutes 
les  choses  du  monde,  de  les  croire  toutes  justes,  et  de  les  faire  valoir 
selon  sa  puissance." 


Provinces  followed  so  shortly  that  the  refusal  cannot  have 
carried  much  weight.  Early  in  1685  Gaultier  appeared  at  the 
electoral  court  as  a  special  agent  of  Orange.^  Fuchs,  during 
the  summer,  negotiated,  at  the  Hague,  a  new  treaty  which,  in 
spite  of  continued  disputes  on  commercial  questions,  laid  the 
foundations  of  real  alliance,  and  would  have  made  Branden- 
burg useless  to  France  in  any  probable  emergency.  In  the 
following  months  Diest  usually  remained  in  the  Netherlands, 
carrying  on  the  regular  diplomatic  business  and  furnishing 
news,  with  special  attention  to  English  affairs.  Much  of  his 
information  came  from  leaders  of  the  O ranee  partv  and 
formed  a  valuable,  tho  possibly  a  partisan,  supplement  to  the 
reports  of  Bonnet  from  London.  The  Provinces  had  an  aeent 
of  inferior  diplomatic  rank,  but  of  good  ability,  at  Berlin. 
Possible  negotiations,  looking  more  directly  to  the  plan  of 
1688,  were  so  largely  oral  and  secret  that  few  traces  remain. 
Toward  the  end  of  1685  Spaen  again  visited  the  Hague,  and 
did  not  confine  himself  to  his  ostensible  mission  of  securing 
a  loan  to  be  expended  on  the  fortifications  of  Wesel.^  What 
discussions  actually  occurred  does  not,  however,  appear. 

The  chief  regular  business  of  1686,  aside  from  Frederick 


1  Frederick  William  to  William,  March  23,  1685 :  "Was  Ew.  Lbd. 
mir  durch — Gaultier  hinterbringen  lassen  wollen,  solches  habe  von 
demselben  bey  verschiedenen  geheimbten  audientien — vernommen. 
Gleichwie  ich  nuhn  nicht  ermangelt  ein  so  wichtiges  werk  reiflich  zu 
iiberlegen,  also  habe  die  noth  erachtet  mit  Ew.  Lbd.  fernerweith  daraus 
in  vertrauen  communiciren  zu  lassen.  Und  weil  ich  ohne  dem  ent- 
schlossen  bin — Fuchs — abzuschicken,  also  werde  demselben  unter  an- 
deren  auch  hierauf  instruiren."    Draft  in  B.  St.  A. 

2  William  to  Frederick  William,  March  1,  1686 :  "J'ay  bien  recu 
les  lettres  que  V.  A.  E.  m'a  fait  Thonneur  de  m'escrire  par  Mr.  le 
Baron  de  Spaen  sur  quoy  je  I'ay  entretenu  longtemps  dont  il  aura  sans 
doute  informe  V.  A.  E.,  et  de  mes  sentiments  sur  la  conjuncture  pre- 
sente,  mais  comme  il  est  necessaire  qu'elle  en  soit  informee  plus  par- 
ticulierement  j'espere  de  le  pouvoir  faire  en  peu  de  jours,  comme  ainsi 
sur  ce  qu'elle  desire  de  savoir  au  regardt  de  Angleterre."  Copy  in 
K.  H.  A. 


8 


William's  vain  attempt  to  hasten  peace  with  the  Turk,  was  the 
inclusion  of  Brandenburg  in  the  Netherlands-Swedish  alli- 
ance. The  Elector  took  evident  interest  in  Eng-lish  develop- 
ments at  this  time,  and,  probably  with  them  in  mind,  agreed 
to  the  interview  at  Cleves  which  took  place  in  July.  Orange 
may  have  suggested  the  meeting  thru  Baron  von  Heyden,^  who 
visited  Berlin  in  April;  tho  it  is  also  to  be  noted  that  Leven,^ 
in  recounting  his  services,  lays  the  chief  emphasis  on  a  mission 
to  BerHn,  thru  which  he  persuaded  Frederick  William  to  go  to 
Cleves.^  Tho  Amerongen  appeared  there  with  the  compli- 
ments of  the  Estates,  the  relations  of  the  princes  are  of  first 
interest.  The  fact  that  Schomberg^  was  not  present  can  hardly 
be  held  to  reduce  the  entire  matter  to  the  realms  of  mere 
speculation.  The  whole  course  of  events,  before  and  after, 
shows  clearly  enough  what  must  have  been  the  chief  subjects, 
about  which  they  would  desire  to  converse.  Furthermore  the 
conversation  between  William  and  Fridag:,  and  Rebenac's  re- 
port of  the  careful  treatment  which  he  received,  bring-  each 


1  William  to  Frederick  William,  May  11,  1686,  "]e  ne  puis  asses 
temoigne  ma  recognoissance  a  V.  A.  E.  du  bon  accuil  qu'elle  a  fait  au 
Baron  de  Heyden.  Et  de  ce  qu'elle  a  bien  voulu  prendre  de  si  bonnes 
resolutions  sur  ce  qu'elle  a  I'honneur  de  luy  representer  de  ma  part." 
Copy  in  K.  H.  A. 

2  David  Mellville,  third  Earl  of  Leven,  1660-1728,  accompanied  his 
father  to  Holland  after  the  Rye  House  plot.  He  entered  the  Branden- 
burg military  service  in  1685,  and  acted  at  various  times  as  agent  be- 
tween Berlin  and  the  Hague.  He  later  raised  the  regiment  with  which 
he  accompanied  Orange  to  England. 

8  "I  must  begin  at  the  time  I  had  the  honour  to  be  known  to  Your 
Lordship  at  the  court  of  Brandenburgh.  I  had  the  honour  to  be  em- 
ployed by  the  Prince  of  Orange — to  negotiate  his  interest  at  that  court 
privately,  and  was  so  happy  as  to  be  the  instrument  of  persuading  his 
Electoral  Highness  to  make  his  journey  to  Cleves,  to  have  an  interview 
with  the  Prince  of  Orange,  in  order  to  concert  measures  for  under- 
taking the  Revolution,  which  was  the  foundation  thereof.  Thereafter 
I  made  several  journeys  from  Berlin  to  the  Hague  with  private  com- 
missions upon  the  same  account,  until  that  matter  was  ripe."  Leven 
and  Mellville  Papers,  p.  XLVL 


some  indirect  confirmation.  It  is  unfortunate  that  the  activity 
of  Avaux,  and  other  accomplished  spies,  made  secrecy  so 
essential.  But  the  very  lack  of  direct  information  about  a 
meeting,  considered  so  important,  is  in  itself  further  evidence 
that  they  discussed  the  religious  and  political  peril,  the  neces- 
sity of  bringing  England  and  the  Empire  into  the  common 
plan,  and  the  need  of  postponing  action.  In  addition  the 
Orange  inheritance  and  some  minor  matters,  such  as  the 
condition  of  the  Piedmontese  Protestants,^  surely  received 
attention. 

As  evidence  of  some  special  interest  in  the  bearing  and 
possibilities  of  the  English  situation  stand  Pufendorf's  ac- 
count, and  Leven's  statement.  Then  there  is  the  fact  that  the 
idea  could  not  have  been  foreign  to  either  of  their  minds,  and 
that  neither  ever  seriously  considered  the  possibility  of  using 
James  by  diplomatic  means,  at  least  after  1685.  The  agents 
of  Orange  in  England  were  chiefly  occupied  in  correspondence 
with  the  King's  enemies,  while  Bonnet  was  little  more  than  a 
careful  reporter  of  news.  They  may  have  hoped  for  a  peace- 
ful inheritance  before  the  new  conflict :  but.  lacking^  this,  thev 
must  have  had  in  mind  the  invasion.  Still  the  time  had  not 
come  for  definite  agreements  and,  if  there  had  been  anything 
of  the  kind,  some  reference  would  have  appeared  later. 

These  interviews  fail  to  smooth  matters  entirely.  The 
difficulties  between  the  Dutch  West  India  Company  and  the 
Brandenburg  African  Company  continue.  As  late  as  March, 
1688,  Rebenac  reports  that  Fuchs,  tho  in  very  poor  health, 
had  himself  carried  to  Potsdam  to  calm  the  Elector,  who  had 
become  enraged  over  new  Dutch  aggressions.-  These  ques- 
tions, however,  decrease  in  importance  in  proportion  to  the 
need  of  association. 


1  This  was  discussed  with  Amerongen.     Compare  his  report  from 
Cleves,  July  27,  1686.    H.  R.  A. 

2  This  report  of  Rebenac,  March  23,  may  be  somewhat  exagger- 
ated, but  it  illustrates  the  importance  of  Fuchs. 


10 

Thru  1687  the  danger  and  rumors  of  danger  increase/  but 
the  web  of  negotiation  and  intrigue  during  the  last  months 
of  the  Great  Elector's  life  lacks  detail.  The  mission  of  Hop  ^ 
very  likely  had  other  aims  than  the  mere  arbitration  of  dif- 
ferences with  Denmark.^  Tho  his  reports  are  largely  in  gen- 
eral terms,  some  suggestion  of  things  below  the  surface  may 
be  seen,  among  them  a  proposition  for  the  union  of  the  Dutch 
and  Brandenburg  fleets.*  A  letter,  carried  by  Leven,  from 
Schomberg  to  Sidney  falls  in  October.^  Undoubtedly  Leven 
had  other  communications  to  make,  and  Schomberg  other  let- 
ters to  write.®  In  November  Pettekum  arrived  as  agent  of 
Orange,  after  the  latter,  according  to  Avaux,  had  decided  it 
impossible  to  go  to  Berlin  himself.  In  February  Leven  re- 
turned to  represent  both  Orange  and  the  Revolutionists  to  the 
Elector  and  his  heir.'^  The  drawing  of  Danklemann  into  these 
interviews  strongly  implies  some  earlier  relations  also  between 
him  and  Orange.  In  March,  Spaen  made  one  of  his  several 
journeys  to  the  Hague,^  perhaps  expecting  now  to  plan  very 
definitely  for  the  summer.  The  entire  want  of  concealment 
may  be  a  witness  to  the  truth  of  the  Elector's  claim  that  Soaen 
had  no  mission  from  him  in  Holland.®     It  may  testify  to  his 


^  See,  for  instance,  Urkunden  und  Akten,  XXV,  1366. 

2  Urkunden  und  Akten,  III,  781  ff . 

3  Report  of  Rebenac  in  Urkunden  und  Akten,  XX,  1246. 

*  This  seems  to  have  gone  no  further.  The  gain  would  not  have 
made  up  for  the  resulting  demands  and  friction. 

5  Sidney  to  William,  June  20/30,  1688.    Sidney  Diary,  II,  269. 

«  Sidney  Diary,  II,  267. 

^  Pufendorf,  "Res  gestae  Friderici  III,"  Lib.  I,  §  68.  "Res  gestae 
Friderici  Wilhelmi  Magni,"  Lib.  XIX,  §  99. 

8  Spanheim  to  Frederick  William,  March  17/27,  "que  ce  n'est  pas 
la  premiere  fois  que  les  courses  a  la  Haye  du  General  Spaen  avoient 
cause,  quoy  que  sans  aucun  fondement  de  pareils  ombrages."    B.  St.  A 

^Frederick  William  to  Spanheim,  Mar.  27-April  6,  "So  viele  aber 
die  allianz  mit  dem  Printz  von  Oranien  wie  auch  die  9000  man  so  wir 
nach  dem  Rhein  marchiren  lassen — da  habt  ihr  dem  Marquis  de  Croissy 
zu  contestiren   das  wir  an   alle  diese   dinge  nie   im  aller  geringsten 


11 


belief  in  the  near  approach  of  the  conflict.  Considering  the 
poHtical  situation  and  the  known  inclinations  of  the  two 
princes,  it  seems  almost  incredible  that  some  such  mission  was 
not  taking  place.  But  only  Avaux  gives  hint  of  success  on 
the  part  of  Spaen,  and  even  he  does  not  suggest  that  Bran- 
denburg intended  to  surrender  any  troops  to  the  service  of  the 
Provinces.  A  relation  from  Spanheim  implies  that  even  Paris 
soon  decided  the  story  to  be  "une  pure  chimere."  Avaux  says 
that  Spaen  "avait  fait  un  accord  avec  le  Prince  d'Oranere  oar 
lequel  en  vertu  du  Traite  fait  il  y  a  trois  ans  entre  I'Electeur 
de  Brandebourg  et  cet  Etat — il  est  convenu  que  I'Electeur 
envoyeroit  dans  le  Duche  de  Cleves  neuf  milles  hommes  pour 
la  surete  du  bas  Rhin."  Certamly  to  reassure  the  Netherlands 
it  would  require  something  more  than  this  placing,  on  their 
borders,  of  an  army  still  allied  with  France.  Whether  there 
is  here  a  failure  to  agree  or  not,  Rebenac,  in  his  final  report 
from  Berlin,^  still  places  great  emphasis  on  the  solidity  of  the 
relations  with  the  Netherlands,  at  least  while  the  old  Elector 
lives.  And  the  number  of  missions,  of  which  traces  remain, 
show  that  the  lack  of  regular  correspondence  was  supple- 
mented by  sufficient  special  communication. 

Meanwhile  England  was  also  preparing  for  1688.  What 
might  have  happened  if  the  development  and  culmination,  in 
England  and  upon  the  Continent,  had  been  less  simultaneous, 
is  a  fruitful  subject  for  speculation.  Fortunately  the  policies 
of  James,  the  readiness  of  the  revolutionists,  and  the  fears 
of  Amsterdam,^  came  to  a  head  in  the  same  months.  William, 
thru  his  English  correspondents,  Dutch  agents  in  England,  and 
Englishmen  of  many  minds  in  the  Netherlands,  had  kept  con- 
stantly informed  as  to  the  changes.     At  first  he  very  likely 


gedacht,  viel  weniger  dergleichen  concertiret  hetten." 

Compare  with  the   secrecy  observed  in   Leven's   mission,  that  of 

Gortz  to  Vienna,  and  the  Fuchs-Bentinck  meeting  in  August. 
^  Revue  Historique,  Jan.,  1902. 
2  They  were  roused  by  the  tales  of  the  refugees,  the  danger  of 

union  between  France  and  England,  and  between  France  and  Cologne. 


12 


hoped  for  good  relations  with  James  and  a  peaceful  succes- 
sion.^ But  he  did  not,  in  any  case,  intend  to  be  hurried  into 
premature  hostilities,  either  by  French  agents  or  his  allies. 
He  had  no  intention  of  adding  his  name  to  the  list  of  unsuc- 
cessful adventurers  for  the  throne  of  England.  This  was  no 
mere  episode  of  personal  history,  but  the  keystone  in  the 
political  struggle  which  he  so  largely  personified.  It  must  be 
undertaken  on  as  certain  a  basis  as  he  could  devise. 

James,  on  the  other  hand,  had  blindly  driven  matters  from 
bad  to  worse  at  home;  while  unfortunate  complications  gave 
rise  to  belief  in  his  close  alliance  with  France,  and  an  ambition 
to  crush  the  United  Provinces.^  Thruout  1687  diplomatists 
everywhere  prophesied  war  between  them  and  England.^  Fi- 
nally political  pamphlets,  the  possibility  of  the  birth  of  an  heir, 
the  demand  for  the  return  of  the  reg^iments  from  the  Dutch 
service,  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  search,  the  second  Declara- 
tion of  Indulgence,  bring  matters,  in  the  Spring  of  1688,  to 
the  point  where  William  could  be  reasonably  certain  of  the 
support  of  the  Estates.*  While  Hoffmann  is  writing,^  from 
London,  that  James  can  not  possibly  prepare  for  war,  the 
King  himself  continues  his  provocations,  and  Avaux  reports 
active  preparations  in  the  Netherlands.^ 

At  the  same  time  Louis  is  waking  to  a  new  offensive. 
The  success  of  the  Emperor  against  the  Turk,  the  activity  of 


1  The    correspondence    given    by    Dalrymple,    for    1685.    certainly 
leaves  this  impression. 

2  This  belief  increases  during  the  Summer,  owing  to  James'  inter- 
ference in  behalf  of  Furstenburg. 

8  Avaux,  Jan.  13  and  Jan.  25. 

Rebenac  to  Louis,  July  17,  1687. 
*  Cavelli,  II,  passim.    Reports  of  Diest  are  full  on  these  questions. 
On  Mar.  4,  1688,  Diest  writes,  "Es  hetten  S'r  May't  von  England 
dess  Princen  von  Oraniens  Ho't  keine  grossere  dienst  thun  undt  ihn 
besser  mit  der  Stadt  Amsterdam  undt  andere  Republiquains  reconcil- 
iren  konnen,  alss  durch  diese  conduite."    B.  St.  A. 
^  Cavelli,  II,  170. 
«  Avaux,  VI,  pp.  136,  147,  149. 


13 


William  and  Brandenburg,  the  question  of  the  Cologne  elec- 
tion, and  the  Palatinate  inheritance,  all  lead  him  to  believe 
that  a  settlement  must  not  be  delayed.  Surely  conditions 
seemed  favorable.  No  ready  alliance  opposed  him.  He  was 
not  the  dupe  of  Frederick  William,  but  felt  that  he  might  still 
use  the  latter's  desire  for  peace  and  subsidies,  and  may  have 
founded  even  greater  hope  upon  Frederick's  supposed  avarice 
and  fears. ^  He  had  also  the  alliance  with  Hanover,  and  with 
Denmark,  naval  supremacy  in  the  Mediterranean,  and  thought 
to  control  Cologne,  As  to  England,  if  he  could  bring  James 
into  his  system,  well  and  good ;  if  not,  he  could  still  make  him 
useful  in  occupying  Orange.  He  intended  that  the  latter 
should  force  James  into  his  arms  on. one  side,  while  French 
armies  conquered  peace  with  the  Hapsburg  on  the  other.  But 
he  failed  utterly  to  estimate  the  outcome  of  this  expedition  to 
England,  which  he  allowed  thru  directing  his  first  attack 
against  the  Empire,  rather  than  against  Holland, 

Thus,  in  the  spring  of  1688,  Europe  faced  a  crisis  which 
the  death  of  the  Great  Elector  did  not  postpone.  There  can 
be  little  doubt  that  even  the  allies  were  relieved  as  to  their 
prospects,  while  Louis  hoped  to  deal  anew  with  his  successor. 
The  relations  between  men  like  Orange  and  Frederick  William 
could  never  be  entirely  smooth.  Neither  was  of  the  type  to 
surrender  independence  or  leadership.  Rebenac  says  of  the 
attitude  of  the  latter,  *'Le  Prince  d'Orange  est  neveu  de  Mon- 
sieur I'Electeur,  mais  la  consideration  qu'on  a  pour  lui  aug- 
mente  et  diminue  de  temps  a  autre."  ^  Avaux  reports  that 
William  was  now  much  more  hopeful  of  success,  especially 
in  negotiating  with  the  House  of  Brunswick.^  Burnet  writes : 
*T  told  him  that  if  the  old  elector  of  Brandenburg  should 
happen  to  die  I  believed  they  might  depend  upon  the  prince 


1  Relying  on  Rebenac's  reports  and  the  promises  of  Schoning  and 
of  Frederick.  Compare  Rebenac  to  Louis,  April  19,  1687,  and  April  6, 
1688,  Rebenac's  final  report,  and  Poussin  to  Croissy,  May  4,  1688. 

2  Rebenac's  final  report,  Revue  Historique,  Jan.,  1902. 

3  Avaux,  VI,  p.  188. 


14 


being  able  to  come  over  by  the  end  of  the  year,  but  if  he 
should  happen  to  languish  long  I  should  scarce  hope  that  the 
thing  could  be  performed."  ^  And  it  may  well  be  that  the 
expedition  could  hardly  have  been  accomplished  under  the 
old  Elector.  William  could  go  to  England,  tho  Frederick 
continued  his  diplomatic  intercourse  with  France,  because  the 
Provinces  had  so  considerable  a  body  of  Brandenburg  troops 
in  their  own  service.  But  that  he  could  have  gone,  while 
Frederick  William  kept  the  protecting  force  under  his  own 
orders  and  was  still  in  alliance  with  France ;  or  that  Frederick 
William  would  either  have  given  up  the  control  of  his  troops 
or  the  hope  of  the  French  subsidies,  all  seem  doubtful.  In 
addition  much  distrust  and  friction  were  now  removed  which 
would  have  made  difficult  the  completion  of  agreements  with 
the  other  North  German  powers.^ 

Frederick  III  was  at  once  faced  by  the  great  question  of 
his  attitude  towards  France  and  William,  and  by  a  number 
of  other  problems  of  not  inconsiderable  importance.  He  was 
never,  like  William,  the  man  of  a  single  all  powerful  idea. 
But  he  had  accepted,  at  least  in  its  main  outlines  the  view  of 
the  European  situation,  held  by  Orange  and  the  Great  Elec- 
tor, by  Waldeck,  Fagel,  Schomberg,  and  Fuchs ;  and  he  played 
his  part.  Indeed,  during  the  first  months  of  his  rule,  he 
nearly  always  turned  his  real  attention  to  the  alliance  with 
William  and  the  curbing  of  France.  This  is  the  positive  side 
of  his  policy.  Here  he  acts,  while  in  dealing  with  France 
he  never  goes  beyond  words.  The  one  course  is  positive, 
offensive,  active,  growing.  The  other  is  essentially  negative, 
defensive  and  tentative.  Even  as  regards  subsidy  payments, 
tho  he  hoped  for  some  results  from  Rebenac's  good  offices,  it 
does  not  seem  that  he  had,  or  could  have  thought  to  have, 


1  Original  memoirs  of  Burnet,  in  Foxcraft,  "Supplement  to  Burnet," 
p.  289. 

2  Miiller,  Vol.  II,  p.  29.  gives  a  brief  description  of  the  attitude  of 
Waldeck  at  this  point. 


15 


any  real  expectations  from  France  after  July.  The  develop- 
ment is  not  always  clear,  especially  before  October.  It  is 
still,  at  times,  the  case  that  existing  papers  give  only  the  hint 
that  something  was  under  way. 

Diest  should  be  able  to  throw  important  light  on  many 
points.  He  was  an  agent  of  long  standing,  a  trusted  agent, 
carrying  on  business  of  consequence  at  the  Hague.  In  so  far 
as  he  dealt  with  the  Estates  little  direct  information  about 
the  plan  of  Orange  could  be  expected.  But  he  was  a  careful 
observer,  in  close  touch  with  conditions  in  England  and  the 
Netherlands,  and  in  constant  intercourse  with  William  and  the 
leaders  of  his  party.  Among  his  reports  are  thirty-four  com- 
munications, dated  between  January  1,  and  May  10,  1688, 
of  which  fourteen  are  postscripts  without  letters  of  the  same 
date.  Of  twenty-six  communications,  between  May  10,  and 
August  27 ^  sixteen  are  postscripts  without  accompanying  let- 
ters. The  two  reports,  not  postscripts,  during  May  and  June,^ 
contain  references  to  interviews  with  Orange  regarding  spe- 
cial commissions,  the  nature  of  which  is  not  discussed.  It 
seems  thus  easy  of  belief  that,  at  least  in  these  months,  Diest 
was  important,  so  much  so  that  the  more  valuable  portion  of 
his  correspondence  was  kept  apart.  There  is  also  to  be  noted 
the  break  in  his  reports,  during  his  visit  to  Berlin  in  the  critical 
month  of  September.  The  drafts  of  most  of  his  instructions, 
beginning  with  September  23,  are  at  hand.  Before  that  date 
there  are  but  five,  for  1688,  of  which  three  deal  with  personal 
matters,  one  with  the  Orange  inheritance,  and  one  with  the 
treaty  of  June  20/30. 

Frederick's  previous  relation  to  the  plan  of  1688  is  not 
beyond  question,  tho  it  is  credible  that  his  knowledge  of  it,  in 
some  form,  goes  back  many  months.    The  terms  of  the  letter,^ 


^  This  is  the  last  report  before  Oct.  15. 

2  May  15/25,  and  June  4/May  25. 

3  Calendar  of  State  Papers,  Domestic,  William  and  Mary,  Vol.  I, 
p.  10.    Feb.  27,  1689. 


16 


congratulating  William  on  ''the  completion  of  the  wishes  which 
some  years  a?o  I  had  formed,"  need  not  imply  any  knowledge 
of  the  actual  plan.  But  previous  correspondence  gives,  here 
and  there,  a  hint  of  something  beyond  mere  compliments, 
felicitation,  and  condolence.  As  early  as  May,  1686,  there 
occurred  a  somewhat  special  exchange  of  courtesies^;  and, 
tho  they  outwardly  betoken  nothing  more,  it  may  be  noted 
that,  since  this  is  the  time  of  Frederick's  secret  agreement  with 
the  Emperor,  he  might  naturally  also  be  looking  toward  Wil- 
liam. In  August,  the  latter  writes  in  terms  of  deep  disappoint- 
ment that  Frederick  did  not  appear  at  Cleves.^  In  1687,  hav- 
ing received  word  that  he  was  opposed  to  Schomberg's  em- 
ployment by  the  Great  Elector,  Orange  sent  him  a  letter  by 
Hompesche,  whose  ostensible  mission  was  condolence  on  the 
death  of  the  Margrave  Ludwig.  William  assures  him  "Votre 
Altesse  en  poura  tirer  de  tres  bons  services,  j'ay  cru  estre 
oblige  de  luy  dire  cecy  puis  qu'elle  pouroit  avoir  d'autre 
information,  et  comme-je  croi  ne  me  pas  tromber  en  I'asseurant 
que  cette  affaire  luy  est  tres  advantageuse  aussi  bien  qu'au 
publique,  j'espere  qu'elle  I'aprouvera  entierement,  sur  quoy  je 
pourrois  luy  dire  bien  des  choses  si  j'aurois  me  fier  au  papier."^ 
Here  Frederick  appears  hardly  informed  upon  each  passing 
detail,  but  certainly  not  unacquainted  with  the  situation.  In 
January,  1688,  to  the  usual  compliments,  Frederick  added  that 
upon  other  matters,  including  the  subject  of  France,  Pettekum 
would  report  his  views.*  William's  unreserved  recommenda- 
tion °  of  Leven  was  answered,  so  far  as  writing  is  concerned, 
by  general  but  complete  assurances. "^     Even  if  Lewius,  whose 


1  At  the  time  Baron  de  Heyden  was  in  Berlin.    William  to  Fred- 
erick, May  11,  1686." 

2  William  to  Frederick,  Aug.  17,  1686.    B.  St.  A. 
8  William  to  Frederick,  May  5,  1687.    B.  St.  A. 

*  Frederick  to  William,  Jan.  7,  1688.    Concept  in  B.  St.  A. 
5  Feb.  28.  1688.    B.  St.  A. 

«  Frederick  to  William,  Mar.  28,  1688.     B.  St.  A.     "Mr.  le  Comte 
de  Leven  m'ayant  rendu  la  lettre  que  V.  A.  m'a  ecrite  en  sa  faveur,  je 


17 


secret  journey  to  Berlin  Pufendorf  mentions/  is  not  to  be 
identified  with  Leven,  his  mission  could  hardly  have  had  the 
abrupt  importance  Pufendorf  assigned  to  it,  for  it  would  not 
have  been  undertaken  without  considerable  previous  search- 
ing of  the  minds  of  both  Frederick  and  Danklemann.  If  the 
two  names  refer,  as  seems  likely,  to  the  same  individual,  it  is 
noteworthy  that  Leven  himself  makes  no  separate  mention 
of  this  affair.  Since  Orange  dealt  with  Frederick  directly,  the 
Elector  would  know  little,  if  anything,  of  their  relations.  And 
it  may  easily  be  that  the  weight,  in  Pufendorf's  story,  should 
have  been  placed  rather  on  the  understanding  between  the 
two  Brandenburg  princes.  In  any  case  the  details  are  lack- 
ing, for  the  vital  portion  of  the  correspondence  was  clearly 
oral. 

Offtcially  to  express  condolence  and  congratulation,  Wil- 
liam sent  Bentinck,  as  a  man  to  whom  Frederick  could  speak 
with  absolute  freedom.^  He  must  have  had  opportunity  for 
s'everal  personal  interviews,  during  his  two  weeks  stay  at  the 
court  of  the  new  Elector.  Tho  it  has  been  suggested  that 
the  latter  made  no  promises  at  this  time,  wishing  first  to  learn 


me  suis  tellement  explique  envers  luy  sur  son  suject  et  sur  tout  ce  qu'il 
m'a  dit  que  je  scay  que  V.  A.  en  sera  satisfaite.  Et  comme  il  luy  en  a 
fait  rapport  aiiquel  V.  A.  se  peut  her  je  n'y  adjouterais  rien ." 

1  'Accedebat  dehinc  sub  finem  Januarii  huius  anni  ad  Electorem 
missus  e  proceribus  Scotiae  Levvius,  qui  ostendebat,  ut  Angliae  pro- 
ceres  liberationem  suam  accelerari  urgeant,  ac  jam  tempus  monere 
judicent,  ut  manus  rei  admoveatur.  Idem  et  jussu  Arausionensis 
Friderico  Principi  Electorali,  ac  soli  Eberhardo  Dankelmanno  id 
secretum  communicabant,  in  cuius  conscientiam  nemo  tota  aula  tunc 
admissus  fuit."    Res  gestae  Friderici  Wilhelmi,  Lib.  XIX,  §  99. 

2  William  to  Frederick,  May,  1688.  B.  St.  A.  "Je  lui  envoye  Mr. 
de  Bentinck  mon  Chamberlan,  lequel  je  luy  prie  de  I'ecoutes  favor- 
ablement,  et  de  luy  donnes  une  entiere  creance  en  ce  qu'il  aura 
^ue  cette  une  personne  a  qui  je  me  fie  entierement,  et  auquel  V.  A.  E. 
I'honneur  de  representer  de  ma  par  a  V.  A.  E.  je  I'ay  choisi  expres  puis 
se  peut  ouvrir  sans  auqu'un  scruple  comme  a  moy  mesme." 


18 


the  decision  of  his  neighbors/  it  would  seem  that  promises, 
in  some  form,  are  impHed.^  They  cannot,  however,  have  been 
detailed,  nor  would  they  prove  any  real  intention  of  acting 
without  the  other  princes.  William  at  least  satisfied  himself 
that  Frederick  could  be  counted  upon,  if  matters  developed 
favorably.  Within  the  next  few  weeks  they  were  rapidly 
carried  beyond  such  unwritten  words,  partly  thru  three  fruit- 
ful events :  the  death  of  Maximilian  Henry  of  Cologne,  the 
birth  of  a  son  to  James,  the  Invitation  of  the  Seven. 

Tho  the  birth  of  an  heir  to  the  throne  of  England  decided 
nothing,  it  had  a  real  effect  on  many  minds.  Incidentally  it 
gave  opportunity  for  a  partial  showing  of  opinion,  when  the 
agents  of  Spain,  Brandenburg,  Celle,  and  Hanover  refused 
to  attend  the  celebration  given  by  Albeville  ^  in  honor  of  the 
event.  The  death  of  the  Archbishop  brought  the  danger  at 
Cologne  to  a  head,^  and  also  increased  the  suspicion  of  an 
alliance  between  Louis  and  James,^  thus  turning  Pope  and 
Emperor  to  William,  and  emphasizing  the  rift  in  the  Catholic 
camp.  The  Invitation  of  the  Seven  came  as  the  formal  sign 
of  readiness  in  England,  and  was  followed  by  less  formal 
invitations  and  promises  of  support  thru  the  summer  and 
autumn.^ 

In  June  Hop,  who  had  returned  from  Hamburg  to  Ber- 
lin immediately  after  the  death  of  Frederick  William,*^  nego- 
tiated the  renewal  of  the  treaties  of  1678  and  1685,  between 
Brandenburg  and  the  Provinces.    He  had,  in  accordance  with 


1  Haake,  p.  29. 

2  Compare  the  instructions  for  Fuchs,  July  21/31,  "Er  hat  dabei  zu 
contestiren  dass  wir  uns  erinnerten  wass  wir  deshalb  bey  seiner  an- 
wesenheit  versprochen."    Ranke,  Werke,  XXI,  p.  307. 

8  English  agent  at  the  Hague.  Compare  Avaux,  VI,  p.  240.  Sim- 
ilar was  the  situation  at  Regensburg. 

*Fear  of  a  new  1672.  Wagenaar,  Vaderlandsche  Historic,  LX 
§IX. 

'^  Pufendorf,  De  rebus  gestis  Friderici  III,  p.  15. 

«  Dalrymple,  Part  I,  Bk.  V,  App. 

7  Report  of  Hop,  May  9/19,  1688.    H.  R.  A. 


19 


instructions  dated  June  9,  made  propositions  in  this  direction ; 
and  Frederick  appointed  Meinders,  Fuchs  and  Danklemann 
to  undertake  the  matter.  In  two  sessions,  June  26  and  June 
29,  they  agreed  without  difficulty  on  the  form  of  renewal  sug- 
gested by  Hop/  A  noticeable  feature  is  the  ease  and  compara- 
tive speed  with  which  the  business  was  carried  thru.^  The 
same  is  true  of  the  Fuchs-Bentinck  meeting,  but  differs  mark- 
edly from  the  course  of  diplomacy  with  France,  Denmark,  Po- 
land, or  the  House  of  Brunswick.  Nevertheless  this  renewal 
of  June  20/30  was  not  ratified,  since  Frederick  made  the  ad- 
justment of  various  long-standing  claims  a  prerequisite.  He 
insisted  upon  this  in  the  conferences  at  Berlin  ^  and  in  the 
notification  and  instructions  sent  to  Diest.*  As  far  as  can  be 
judged  Diest  took  up  the  old  negotiation  with  the  support  of 
Orange,  and  with  some  new  hope  of  success.  Nothing  came 
of  it.  The  time  allowed  for  ratification  passed,  and  his  instruc- 
tions of  September  23  still  direct  him  to  say  th3.t  the  treaty 
can  only  be  completed  if  certain  specified  steps  are  taken 
toward  removing  the  causes  of  complaint.  The  same  state- 
ment was  made  to  Hop,  when  he  proposed  the  exchange  of 
ratifications,  shortly  before  his  departure  for  Vienna.^  But 
the  illness  and  death  of  William's  powerful  champion,  the 
Grand  Pensionary  Fagel,  caused  delay^;  and,  even  after  the 


1  Reports  of  Hop,  June  17/27  and  July  4,  1688. 

2  The  speedy  renewal  of  this  treaty  was  described,  both  by  Fred- 
erick and  Croissy,  as  a  special  sign  of  close  relations  with  William  and 
the  Netherlands.  Compare  Frederick  to  Diest,  July  2,  and  Spanheim 
to  Frederick,  July  6/16.    B.  St.  A. 

3  On  July  4  Hop  writes,  "Dat  mijn  Heer  de  Churfurst  in  verwach- 
tinge  was  da  thaar  Ho.  Mog.  voor  date  van  het  uijtwisseln  van  ratifi- 
catien  van  de  bovengeroerde  conventie  of  acte  van  renouvellement, 
souden  willen  adjustiren  het  bewuste  reglement  tuschen  beyde  de 
voorschreven  compagnien,  ende  de  gereezene  quartie  over  de  forten  van 
Acada  en  Taccorary."    H.  R.  A. 

*  Frederick  to  Diest,  June  22/July  2. 
5  Report  of  Hop,  October  3,  1688.    H.  R.  A. 

^  Diest  was  still  urging  the  carrying  out  of  the  resolutions  in  May, 
1689.    See  his  correspondence  with  Estates  in  H.  R.  A. 


20 


Estates  took  the  necessary  resolutions,  they  were  not  pushed 
to  completion.  By  this  time  the  situation  had,  in  any  case, 
grown  far  beyond  the  limits  of  the  old  treaty;  and  Branden- 
burg was  seeking  a  new  and  strong  alliance  with  the  Provinces 
and  England.  On  the  other  hand  it  should  be  noted  that,  after 
Frederick  announced  the  renewal  to  his  foreign  representa- 
tives, the  treaty  had  been  very  generally  looked  upon  as  com- 
plete. In  fact,  as  long  as  he  needed  to  use  it  in  explanation 
of  his  transfer  of  troops  to  the  service  of  the  Netherlands, 
he  could  not  well  deny  its  validity.  Nor  does  he  appear  to 
have  thought  of  doing  so,  except  in  the  hope  of  making  it  a 
leverage  for  a  settlement  in  the  matter  of  the  African  Com- 
pany. In  fact  Fuchs  and  Danklemann  distinctly  declare  to 
Hop,  that  Frederick  has  no  intention  of  viewing  it  as  other 
than  valid.^ 

These  events,  added  to  William's  preliminary  intercourse 
with  other  German  princes,  leave  the  ground  as  firm  as  may  be 
for  the  meeting  of  Fuchs  and  Bentinck  in  August.  Here  the 
importance  of  Fuchs,  who  was  at  once  statesman,  minister, 
diplomatist,  and  envoy,  is  very  conspicuous.  Like  Frederick 
William  he  had,  for  a  time,  supported  the  French  alliance,  but 
had  become,  at  least  since  1685,  a  leader  of  the  hostile  party. 
His  instructions  and  reports  ^  give  a  good  picture  of  the  actual 
meeting,  tho  the  preliminary  history  has  its  own  interest.  Ap- 
parently, when  word  reached  Berlin  that  someone  must  meet 
Bentinck,  the  Court  found  difficulty  in  choosing  the  proper 
agent,  and  in  framing  his  instructions.  There  is  an  undated 
memorial  of  July,  in  which  the  name  of  Ruck  ^  is  substituted 
for  that  of  Grumbkow,  who  seems  to  have  been  first  thought 
of  as  the  agent  of  Brandenburg.  It  obviously  served  as  the 
basis  of  certain  opinions  expressed  by  Fuchs,  and  with  modi- 
fications for  his  instructions.    This  memorial  proposed  allow- 


1  Hop  to  Estates.    Oct.  3.  1688.    H.  R.  A. 

2  Ranke,  Werke,  XXI,  307-318.  and  Droysen,  Gesch.  d.  pr.  Politik, 
IV,  1,  pp.  214-217. 

8  Ruck  was  at  this  time  Brandenburg  agent  at  Altona. 


21 


ing  the  Netherlands  to  use  five  designated  battahons,  of  five 
hundred  men  each,  to  be  supported  by  them,  since  Frederick 
would  replace  them  at  once  with  new  recruits.  Also  Ruck  was 
to  seek  ''subsidien  oder  sonsten  einige  avantageuse  condi- 
tiones,"  and  to  arrange  the  whole  affair  so  as  to  avoid  collision 
with  France.^ 

Upon  these  points  Fuchs  commented. ^  He  suggested  that 
it  would  be  more  practicable  to  offer  a  given  number  of  men, 
which  he  increased  to  4000,  rather  than  specified  regiments. 
As  to  the  second  article,  concerning  their  support,  he  found 
nothing  to  say.  He  thought  the  question  of  subsidies  so  deli- 
cate that,  if  brought  up  carelessly,  it  might  turn  the  Estates 
from  Orange  and  the  whole  plan ;  but  he  felt  sure  that  Orange 
himself  could  arrange  to  help  Frederick,  and  this  might  be 
discussed  with  Bentinck.  Fuchs  went  on  to  insist  that  such 
consideration  and  fear  of  France,  as  appeared  in  the  memor- 
ial, would  prevent  all  action  whatever,  and  that  alliances  with 
Saxony,  the  House  of  Hanover,  and  Hesse-Cassel  were  advis- 
able. In  this  memorial  Fuchs  advanced  decidedly  beyond  the 
mere  question  at  hand.  He  set  forth  his  opinion  upon  the 
attitude  which  Frederick  must  take  in  regard  to  France,  the 
plan  of  1688,  and  the  German  Princes.  While  advocating 
no  speedy  rupture  with  France,  he  perceived  clearly  the  danger 


1  Two  minor  changes  were  made  in  the  memorial,  aside  from  the 
substitution  of  Ruck's  name  for  that  of  Grumbkow.  The  second  article 
was  changed  to  read,  "Was  dero  verpflegung  betrifft  hat  er  dahin  zu 
sehen  dass  dieselbe  von  dem  Staat  geschehen  zumahl  S.  C.  D.  gesonnen 
sei  alsofort  neue  werbungen — anzustellen."  The  reason  first  given  had 
been,  "solche  als  wie  vor  diesem  von  Sr.  Ho't  und  des  Staats  seitens 
zu  berlin  vorgeschlagen  worden."     The  fourth  article  read  originally, 

"Es  muss  aber  solche  schickung  der  volcker ."    This  was  changed  to 

read,  "Es  wird  aber  dienlich  sein  solche  schickung  der  volcker  keinen 
anderen  nahmen  zu  geben  als  dass  selbigen  nur  geliehen  werden,  damit 
S.  C  D.  desfals  nicht  mit  Frankreich  und  anderen  in  collision  gerahten 
mogen  wie  solches  des  Printzen  von  Oraniens  Ho't  selbst  einlassen." 
B.  St.  A. 

2  B.  St,  A.    Haake,  page  33,  gives  a  considerable  quotation. 


22 


of  too  great  caution,  and  the  need  of  a  new  system  of  alli- 
ances. He  distinguished  between  Orange  and  the  Dutch  Re- 
public. He  realized  that  it  was  not  from  the  Provinces,  but 
from  William  in  England,  that  financial  aid  must  be  first 
sought.  This  is  all  stated  briefly  and  without  reserve,  but 
carefully,  and  with  thorough  appreciation  of  conditions.  A 
second  memorial  counsels  sending  a  special  messenger  to 
Bentinck  to  complete  arrangements,  and  considers  at  length 
the  possible  relations  with  the  Landgrave.  The  position  of 
Hanover  is  also  mentioned  again,  and  the  opinion  expressed 
that  the  Duke  may  be  drawn  away  from  France  "wann  der 
Printz  von  Oranien  mit  einige  wirkligkeit  dazur  concurriren 
wolthe  welches  mit  dem  Herren  von  Bentinck  zu  concertiren." 
The  actual  instructions  are  based  on  these  memorials. 
Fuchs  is  to  reach  Bentinck  secretly,  and  determine  the  senti- 
ments of  Orange  and  the  Estates  "wegen  des  gegenwertigen 
Englischen  wesens."  He  is  to  reaffirm  Frederick's  promises, 
and  to  say  that  4000  men  will  be  placed  in  Cleves  ready  to 
march  into  the  Netherlands.  The  negotiations  with  Hesse- 
Cassel,  and  the  question  of  Hanover  are  to  be  discussed.  Then 
come  the  two  topics,  money  and  the  Orange  inheritance,  which 
play  a  large  part  in  previous  as  well  as  later  negotiations.  The 
question  of  subsidies  was  important.  Brandenburg  needed  an 
expensive  army.  Part  of  its  support  was  one  of  the  advantages 
she  expected  to  draw  from  any  alliance,  with  the  subsidy 
paying  powers.  Like  James  H,  both  Frederick  HI  and  his 
father  intended  to  combine  this  with  complete  independence 
of  action,  and  were  not  always  successful.  As  to  the  Orange 
inheritance,  it  would  not  seem  to  have  been  sufficiently  em- 
phasized. It  was  an  old  hope  of  Frederick  William,^  which 
is  surely  no  less  strong  in  the  mind  of  his  son.  Even  before 
he  succeeded  to  the  Electorate,  Frederick  was  correspondinr 
with  Spanheim  in  regard  to  the  claims  of  the  Marquis  de 
Sohre,^  which  continue  to  form  a  chief  point  of  difference 


1  Several    references   in   Urkunden   und   Akten,   Vol.    XX.     Also 
strongly  emphasized  in  the  instructions  for  Fuchs,  Apr.  28,  '85. 

2  Frederick  to  Spanheim,  April  28,  1688. 


23 


with  Louis  thruout  July  and  August.  The  inheritance  offered 
large  possibilities  of  dynastic  gain  without  war;  and  Haake 
is  surely  right  in  saying  that  hope  of  advance,  without  drawing 
the  sword,  was  particularly  likely  to  appeal  to  the  Elector. 
It  was  too  a  very  real  hope,  and  of  long  past  and  future  his- 
tory. As  compared  with  the  Swedish  scheme,  it  was  not  a 
matter  requiring  so  much  present  haste,  tho  Haake  surely 
overemphasizes  that  ephemeral  northern  plan,  which  was,  after 
all,  one  of  many.  ^  But  it  is  hidden  enough  to  attract  atten- 
tion, while  the  importance  of  the  Orange  inheritance,  in  the 
mind  of  Frederick,  is  perhaps  so  obvious  that  it  has  somewhat 
escaped  comment.  Nevertheless  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
the  part  it  played  in  influencing  his  thought  and  action  was 
very  great.^  Just  at  this  time  the  question  received  other  atten- 
tion, aside  from  that  mentioned  above,  one  long  instruction 
to  Diest  ^  upon  the  subject  being  dated  two  days  before  that 
of  Fuchs. 

But  the  real  cause  of  action  must  be  sought  elsewhere.  It 
is  not  possible  to  feel  that  Frederick  waited  long  to  bargain, 
whatever  his  father  might  have  done.  The  political  position 
remained  the  first  consideration,  and  he  definitely  directed 
that  Fuchs  handle  the  question  of  advantages  "mit  solcher 
behutsamkeit — damit  es  nicht  scheine  ob  suchten  wir  einigen 
eigenutz  darunter."  This  absence  of  pressure  was  probably 
very  largely  due  to  Fuchs'  reading  of  the  situation;  and  it 
was  doubtless  quite  correct.  Moveover  Frederick  could  havt 
no  real  hope  of  subsidies  from  William  before  the  rupture 
with  France.  For  that  he  was  not  prepared,  nor  is  there  any 
sign  that  William  desired  it  at  this  time. 

The  meeting  between  Fuchs  and  Bentinck,  at  Celle,  was 


1  Compare  also  Hans  Rodding,  "Puf endorf  als  Historiker  und 
Politiker"  (Halle,  1912),  pp.  97-101. 

2  Burnet  says :  "As  the  elector  is  the  prince  of  Orange's  cousin 
germaine  by  his  mother  and  heir  by  provision — so  he  not  only  has  a 
particular  friendship  for  him,  but  agrees  with  him  in  the  same  notions 
and  designs."    Foxcraft,  Supplement  to  Burnet,  p.  279. 

3  July  19/29,  1688. 


24 


carefully  arranged,  and  attracts  no  apparent  attention/  Ben- 
tinck  at  once  placed  new  emphasis  on  the  necessity  for  speedy 
action.  Otherwise  James,  supported  by  a  packed  Parliament 
and  foreign  mercenaries,  would  either  gain  control  and  ally 
himself  with  Louis,  or  his  opponents  would  establish  a  neu- 
tral republic.  Fuchs  is  led  to  believe  that  Orange  will  sail 
in  about  six  weeks.  Only  success  is  to  be  expected,  for  Eng- 
land and  Scotland  desire  it  almost  to  a  man ;  James  could  not 
depend  on  his  army  or  navy;  William  would,  in  any  case, 
have  strength  enough ;  and  French  aid,  even  if  granted  to 
James,  would  only  increase  the  domestic  unrest  out  of  all 
proportion.  Bentinck  went  on  to  report  the  "secreta  secre- 
torum"  that  an  attempt  by  Louis  to  draw  the  Emperor  into  a 
great  Catholic  league  had  failed ;  and  that  William  would  have 
the  support  of  the  Netherlands  both  officially  and  unofficially. 
The  only  danger  was  a  French  attack  during  his  absence,  to 
prevent  which  he  desired  treaties  with  Celle  and  Hesse-Cassel, 
as  well  as  with  Brandenburg,  Some  discussion  of  the  amount 
of  *'Werbegeld",  and  the  possibility  of  securing  6000  troops, 
instead  of  4000,  followed.  Fuchs  was  uninstructed  on  these 
points,  but  thought  that  the  least  which  Frederick  could  accept 
would  be  12  Reichsthalers  for  each  footman,  and  forty  for 
each  horseman.  It  is  noticeable  that  Fuchs  makes  no  mention 
of  subsidies,  in  spite  of  his  instructions.  He  did,  however, 
bring  up  the  question  of  the  Orange  inheritance,  and  secured 
Bentinck's  promise  that  William  would  make  a  new  testa- 
ment, in  favor  of  Frederick,  before  gomg  to  England. 

From  these  interviews  at  Celle  grew  the  treaty  completed 
there  on  August  5/15.  Its  terms  provided  that  about  six 
thousand  troops  should  be  given  over  to  the  Provinces  in 
September.  For  recruiting  expenses  the  amount  suggested 
by  Fuchs  was  to  be  paid.  While  in  the  Dutch  service  they 
were  to  be  paid  and  supported  by  the  Estates.  This  result 
seems  to  have  been  brought  about  rather  by  Fuchs  than  by 


1  The  English  agent  at  Regensburg  was  in  possession  of  a  rumor 
that  Bentinck  had  accompanied  the  Landgrave  to  Berlin.  Valkenier 
to  the  Estates,  August  16,  1688.    H.  R.  A. 


25 


Frederick.  Frederick  probably  intended  the  transfer  of  four 
thousand  troops  by  virtue  of  the  earlier  treaties,  securing  at 
the  same  time  some  definite  concessions.  But  this  treaty, 
negotiated  by  Fuchs,  was  certainly  the  almost  necessary  form, 
if  William  were  to  carry  out  his  plans.  On  the  other  hand, 
Frederick  seems,  at  first  sight,  to  have  agreed  to  furnish  a 
considerable  force  with  no  apparent  special  gain  for  himself. 
Still  it  may  be  assumed  that,  however  great  his  interest  in 
the  plan  for  general  religious  and  political  reasons,  he  saw 
also  some  particular  advantages  in  it  as  it  stood — at  least  the 
Orange  inheritance,  and  the  chance  of  employing  his  troops 
against  France,  while  still  postponing  the  break  with  that 
country.  The  negotiation  leaves  the  impression  that  both 
Bentinck  and  Fuchs  felt  it  best  to  paint  matters  as  favorably 
as  might  be,  making  no  mention  of  possible  complications  in 
Ireland,  or  the  danger  that  William  might  not  be  able  to  leave 
the  Continent.  Still  it  seems  evident  that  the  Elector  wished 
to  appear  as  a  leading,  tho  secret  ally,  and  that  William  was 
glad  to  encourage  him  in  this  attitude,  more  glad  than  Fred- 
erick realized  until  he  began  to  seek  subsidies  in  January  of 
the  next  year.  Then  he  found  William  saying  that  he  should 
not  expect  direct  financial  reward  from  his  allies  for  taking 
part  in  a  struggle  to  which  his  own  interests  called  him. 

This  was,  of  course,  a  secret  agreement,  and  the  claim 
was  always  made  that  the  regiments  were  furnished  by  virtue 
of  earlier  treaties.^  In  contrast  with  the  renewal  of  June 
20/30,  it  was  a  question  of  arrangements  between  Orange  and 
Frederick  with  which  the  Estates  have,  for  the  moment,  noth- 
ing to  do.  William  expressed  his  gratification  to  Frederick 
in  a  personal  letter,^  reminding  him  that  the  time  is  short,  and 


1  Compare,  for  instance,  Spanheim  to  Frederick.  Dec.  20/30,  where 
he  says  that  concerning  the  "cession  ou  joncture  de  quelques  troupes 
aux  Hollandais,  je  priois  ledit  de  Croissy  de  considerer — que  dailleurs 
ce  n'estait  qu'en  execution  des  anciens  traittes  purement  diffensifs  et 
renouvelles  des  le  commencement  de  la  Regence  de  V.  A.  E."    B.  St.  A. 

2  August  13,  1688.    B.  St.  A. 


26 


that  he  ought  to  order  his  more  distant  regiments  to  march 
at  once.  In  September  they  met  at  Minden,  but  little  remains 
to  show  what  took  place.  Pufendorf  is  silent,  and  Frederick's 
explanation,  for  Croissy,  that  it  was  a  mere  question  of 
friendly  intercourse  is  purely  diplomatic.^  They  must  have 
reviewed  the  whole  contemporary  situation;  but  there  is  no 
sign,  then  or  later,  of  any  particular  further  agreement.  What- 
ever details  may  have  been  arranged  doubtless  lost  much  of 
their  force,  as  a  result  of  the  rapid  developments  of  Sep- 
tember. Only  a  short  time  later  William  does  not  know,^ 
without  further  correspondence,  whether  Frederick  would 
allow  the  placing  of  an  army  near  Wesel,  or  not.  The  proba- 
bility that  William  would  acquire  the  English  crown  may  well 
have  been  mentioned;  for  in  February,  Frederick  writes,  "I 
cannot  express  the  greatness  of  the  joy  caused  in  me,  by  the 
completion  of  the  wishes  which  some  years  ago  I  had  formed, 
and  particularly  six  months  ago  at  Minden."  ^  The  interview 
would  seem  at  least  to  have  passed  very  pleasantly,  with  mu- 
tual satisfaction  as  to  their  several  attitudes.* 

During  the  next  few  weeks,  while  William  completed  his 
preparations,  and  Diest  was  in  Berlin,  Frederick  devoted  him- 
self more  and  more  openly  to  the  cause.  On  his  journey  to 
Minden  he  had  conferred  with  the  Elector  of  Saxony  at  Anna- 
burg.    On  his  return  he  stopped  at  Hanover,^  receiving  prom- 


1  Instructions  for  Spanheim,  from  Minden,  Aug.  29/Sept.  8.  As  to 
the  meeting  with  Orange,  "So  habet  Ihr  anzubringen  dass  zu  dersel- 
ben  allein  die  nahe  verwantniss  und  sonderbahre  propension  so  einer 
zu  dem  andern  billig  traget  anlass  gegeben,  sonsten  aber  von  aufrich- 
tung  einer  alliance  und  dergleichen  nichts  gedacht  viel  weniger  solche 
geschlossen  worden." 

2  William  to  Waldeck,  Oct.  2,  Miiller,  II,  p.  111. 

8  Calendar  of  State  Papers,  Domestic,  William  and  Mary,  I,  page 
10.    Original  in  the  Record  Office. 

*  Compare  William  to  Frederick,  Sept.  20,  1688.  "Je  me  sens  si 
vivement  touche  de  toutte  les  marques  d'amitie  dont  V.  A.  E.  m'a 
honore  pendant  que  j'ay  en  la  satisfaction  d'estre  aupres  d'elle  que  je 
ne  puis  asses  luy  en  temoigner ." 

*  Haake  says,  page  36,  "und  kehrte  uber  Hannover,  wo  er  statt  des 


27 


ises  that  the  Duke  would  act,  if  the  Empire  were  attacked. 
This  was  some  advance  over  the  very  indefinite  good  wishes 
which  Ernst  August  had  sent  to  WilHam  a  month  earHer.^ 
On  the  twentieth  of  September,  Schomberg  added  the  Branden- 
burg forces  to  the  garrison  of  Cologne.  A  few  days  later 
Grumbkow  left  for  Cleves  to  transfer  the  Brandenburg  regi- 
ments to  the  Dutch  service.^  About  this  time  Frederick  gave 
up  the  idea  of  going  to  Prussia  before  conditions  improved  in 
the  West.  His  regiments  were  marching,  and  recruiting  was 
proceeding  successfully.  Further  developments  depended  upon 
the  action  of  Louis. 

On  October  7,  the  Elector,  hunting  in  the  neighborhood 
of  Berlin,  received  word  of  the  attack  on  the  Palatinate.  He 
returned  at  once  to  his  Capital,  conferred  with  the  resident 
agents  of  the  allies,  and  sent  special  representatives  to  their 
courts.^  Fuchs  went  to  Celle,  Hanover,  Munster,  and  the 
Hague;*  Anhalt  and  Schmettau  to  Leipzig;  Mandelslo  to  the 


gehofften  Anschlusses  an  den  Defensivbund  nur  ein  Neutralitatsver- 
sprechen  durchsetzen  konnte,  in  seine  Residenz  zuruck."  But  in  the 
instructions  for  Fuchs.  Sept.  28,  Frederick  says  in  regard  to  Hanover, 
"Ihre  Durchl.  hette  uns  bey  unserer  jungsten  anwesenheit  festiglich 
versprochen,  dass  wan  Frankreich  das  Reich  attaquieren  solte,  Sie 
alsdan  mit  aller  Ihrer  Macht  concurriren  wolten,  der  casus  were  jetzo 
ohnstreitg  entstanden."  This  is  the  important  point,  for  no  one  was 
ready  to  go  far  before  the  beginning  of  the  French  attack. 

^  Ernst  August  to  William,  July  24/Aug.  3.  "Ce  m'est  une  morti- 
fication tres  sensible  de  voir  partir  M.  de  Renting  sen  pouvoir  satisfaire 
a  la  desmende  qu'il  ma  fait  de  la  parte  de  V.  A. — Celle  que  V.  A.  vient 
de  me  donner  de  sa  confience  me  touche  sensiblement  elle  pent  estre 
assuree  que  je  n'en  abusere  jamais — J'espere  aussi  qu'il  ce  presentera 

bientot  une  occasion  pour  moy  plus  favorable  que  la  presente ." 

L.  R.  O. 

2  Report  of  Ham  for  Sept.  16/26,  says  that  Grumbkow  has  left  for 
Cleves,  "om  saken  van  importantie  aldaar  te  beschicken  en  de  bewuste 
6000  Churfurstelijke  Volkeren  in  den  dienst  van  een  naarburige  Geal- 
lieerde  Macht  in  conformite  van  het  secreete  tractaat  te  doen  overgaan." 
H.  R.  A. 

3  Report  of  Ham,  Oct.  10,  1688.    H.  R.  A. 

*  Instructions  for  Fuchs,  Sept.  28/Oct.  8.    B.  St.  A. 


28 


Prankish,  Swabian  and  Upper  Rheinish  circles.  At  Hanover 
Fuchs  was  also  to  meet  the  Hesse-Cassel  minister,  Gortz. 
From  the  correspondence  of  the  next  ten  days  sprang  the  con- 
ference at  Magdeburg,  and  agreement  on  an  organized  line 
of  defense.  It  is  not  necessary  to  overemphasize  the  part  of 
Frederick.  He  probably  did  not  suggest  the  conference.  It 
is  not  mentioned  in  the  instructions  of  Fuchs,  but  in  his  report 
from  Hanover  as  if  it  had  been  suggested  there.  Certainly 
Fuchs  found  Hesse-Cassel  and  the  House  of  Brunswick  ready 
to  concert  all  reasonable  measures  of  defense.^  Frederick 
was  not  the  only  one  who  felt  a  vital  interest.  It  cannot  be 
shown  that  he  was  more  ready  than  the  others  to  proceed  to 
an  immediate  offensive,  or  that  the  hesitancy  of  the  Duke  of 
Hanover  alone  prevented  this.^  He  had  a  far  reaching  plan 
of  operations,  and  gladly  prompted  his  allies  to  action;  but 
that  he  would  have  hastened  his  own  rupture  with  France, 
either  with  or  without  the  support  of  Hanover,  seems  con- 
trary both  to  the  evidence,  and  the  demands  of  the  situation. 
At  the  same  time  he  was  willing,  and  very  active,  in  doing  what 
needed  to  be  done.  This  was  decisive  in  the  matter  of  the 
Magdeburg  Conference,  and  of  the  utmost  importance. 

Meanwhile,  as  a  result  of  the  French  attack,  William  felt 
that  he  could  persuade  Frederick  to  further  measures,  since 
*'il  y  a  point  d'autre  moien  pour  la  seurete  de  ses  propres 
estates."^  In  two  letters,  of  October  5,  and  October  15,  he 
urged  the  hurrying  of  all  possible  troops  to  the  Rhine,  the 


1  Fuchs  to  Frederich,  Oct.  3/13,  from  Celle.  "Ich  kann  E.  C.  D. 
nicht  genug  beschreiben  was  vor  einen  eiffer  man  alhie  gegen  Frank- 
reich  spuren  lassen."    B.  St.  A. 

2  That  the  delay  was  the  fault  of  Hanover  seems  to  be  the  impli- 
cation of  Haake,  pp.  50-54.  But  his  evidence  needs  a  great  deal  of 
strengthening.  It  seems  inconceivable  that,  in  October,  "Der  Gedanke 
war  oflfenbar,  des  Gegners  in  Westen  so  schnell  als  moglich  ledig  zu 
werden,  um  die.  Krafte  in  Balde  fur  den  Norden  wieder  verfugbar  zu 
haben ;". 

8  William  to  Frederich,  Oct.  5,  1688.    B.  St.  A. 


29 


employment  of  Frederick's  influence  with  Saxony,  and  his 
presence  at  Minden  or  Sparenberg.  This  last  suggestion  came 
also  from  various  other  sources.^  The  Elector  replied  that 
orders  for  the  march  of  his  troops  had  been  given,  and  that 
he  himself  would  go  to  Westphalia.^  These  points  were 
brought  up  again,  when  Fuchs  was  with  the  Prince  at  the 
end  of  the  month.  His  mission  dealt  with  the  posting  of 
troops,  the  necessity  of  calling  a  Parliament  in  England,  and 
of  bringing  that  country  into  the  war  without  delay.  He  ex- 
plained Frederick's  position,  the  need  of  placing  Brandenburg 
forces  on  the  middle  Rhine,^  and  also  in  the  North  to  observe 
Denmark.  William  answered  with  new  expressions  of  grati- 
tude, and  repeated  his  thoughts  as  to  Frederick's  further  move- 
ments, receiving  similar  promises.  It  was  indeed  rumoured  at 
Berlin,*  as  early  as  September  30,  that  the  journey  to  his 
restless  Prussian  Duchy  would  be  replaced  by  one  to  Wesel. 
On  November  9,  Frederick  finally  left  Berlin,  and  traveling 
through  Spandau,  Hanover,  Minden,  and  Sparenberg,  reached 
Wesel  on  the  fifth  of  December." 

The  regular  diplomatic  intercourse  of  Brandenburg  and 
the  Provinces  remained  in  the  hands  of  Hop,  and  Ham,  at 
Berlin,  and  of  Diest  at  the  Hague.  Until  his  departure  for 
Vienna,  in  October,  Hop  was  chiefly  occupied  with  the  re- 
newal of  treaties,  and  the  settlement  with  Denmark.  As 
mediator  between  the  Provinces  and  Denmark,  Frederick,  or 
at  least  his  ministers,  played  no  inconsiderable  part.®  Diest, 
up  to  the  end  of  August,  was  pressing  the  affair  of  the  African 


1  Waldeck  to  William,  Oct.  4.     Muller,  Vol.  II,  p.  113. 
Diest  to  Frederich.  Oct.  16/26.     B.  St.  A. 

2  Frederich  to  William,  Oct.  11/21.    Draft  in  B.  St.  A. 

3  Fuchs  to  Frederich.  Oct'  12/22,  from  the  Hague. 
**  Report  of  Ham.  Sept.  30.    H.  R.  A. 

^  The  reports  of  Ham,  who  accompanied  Frederick,  cover  many 
details  of  this  journey. 

<5  The  reports  of  Hop,  particularly  that  of  July  7,  mention  several 
points  where  the  Brandenburg  ministers  interfered  and  secured  agree- 
ment as  to  the  preliminary  treaty. 


30 


Company,  the  aid  for  the  Piedmontese  refugees,  and  other 
minor  subjects.  When  he  returned  to  the  Hague,  in  October, 
the  situation  had  distinctly  changed.  It  was  no  longer  a  matter 
requiring  great  secrecy.  France  had  delivered  the  first  attack. 
The  Estates  were  active.  Everyone  knew  that  England  was 
the  object  of  the  preparations  of  Orange.  Diest's  papers  now 
show  Brandenburg  as  the  acknowledged  ally  of  the  Provinces, 
in  full  communication  with  them  on  all  points  of  common 
interest.  During  November  and  December,  indeed,  the  rela- 
tions of  Frederick  with  the  Estates  were  much  more  full  and 
important  than  those  with  Orange. 

These  negotiations,  from  the  middle  of  October,  naturally 
center  about  military  affairs.  Agreement  did  not,  by  any 
means,  follow  as  a  matter  of  course.  Not  only  the  points  of 
view  as  to  the  immediate  aims  to  be  sought,  but  also  the 
opinions  as  to  the  best  means  of  attaining  them,  constantly 
differed.  The  case  was  complicated,  too,  by  the  fact  that 
Waldeck  and  the  authorities  at  the  Hague  had  both  to  be 
considered.  Tho  Frederick  apparently  recommended  the  same 
measures  to  both,  without  participation  in  the  difficulties  be- 
tween them,  he  seems  unwilling  to  attempt  to  work  with 
Waldeck  alone,  and  to  have  believed  that  his  ends  would  be 
more  surely  attained  thru  constant  persuasion  at  the  Hague. 
Nor  was  Waldeck  any  more  ready  to  act  without  authorization 
from  the  Estates.  Frederick's  attitude  was  always  that  of  an 
ally  against  France,  for  at  heart  he  realized  that  there  could 
be  no  greater  danger  for  him  than  that  Louis  should  fall  with 
destructive  force  upon  the  Netherlands.  Nevertheless  his 
plans  inevitably  design  first  to  protect  his  own  lands.  To  this 
end  he  believed  it  possible  both  to  postpone  his  break  with 
France  and  to  use  the  Dutch  army  directly  for  his  own  greater 
security.  That  he  consciously  waited  the  result  of  the  Eng- 
lish undertaking  cannot  be  shown,  tho  it  is  very  evident  that 
everything  turned  upon  its  success  or  failure,  and  that  Europe 
had  eyes  for  little  else.  Even  Louis  may  have  held  back, 
somewhat,  to  see  whether  James  would  be  able  to  do  a  con- 


31 


siderable  portion  of  his  fighting  for  him.  And  that  Frederick 
wished  still  to  gain  time  is  obvious.  Tho  his  policy,  viewed 
as  a  whole,  was  sufficiently  broad,  it  called  for  some  delay 
in  the  declaration  of  his  own  offensive. 

He  had  delivered  to  the  Provinces,  without  previous  bar- 
gaining, a  considerable  proportion  of  the  forces  prepared  for 
action.  Naturally  some  regret  followed.^  He  doubtless  felt 
not  only  the  pressure  of  France,  but  also  the  decrease  in  his 
own  independent  power.  Tho  he  aims,  in  what  followed, 
to  repair  these  evils,  to  turn  all  possible  strength  to  the  direct 
protection  of  his  own  lands,  and  to  bring  as  much  military 
force  as  might  be,  under  his  own  control,  he  is  also  looking 
to  the  spring  campaign.  In  order  that  it  might  be  undertaken 
as  advantageously  as  possible,  and  beyond  his  own  borders,  he 
found  some  preliminary  clearing  of  the  ground  advisable. 
But  Waldeck,  in  whose  hands  the  decision  as  to  the  military 
plans  remained,  at  least  theoretically,  had  as  many  reasons 
for  a  wise  defensive  as  Frederick.  He  viewed  with  large 
distrust  any  frittering  away  of  the  army  on  preliminary  move- 
ments, before  it  reached  its  full  strength,  before  the  allies 
were  gathered,  and  Frederick  was  ready  himself  to  take  an 
active  part.  And  he  was  supported  in  this  attitude  by  Wil- 
liam, and  also  by  the  Estates. 

Thru  the  connection  with  Furstenberg,  the  French  had, 
practically  speaking,  taken  possession  of  various  points  in  the 
Archbishopric,  even  before  the  attack  on  the  Palatinate.  From 
these  positions  they  constantly  threatened  the  city  of  Cologne, 
and  the  neighboring  territories.  Thus  William's  idea,  after 
the  direction  of  the  main  French  attack  was  known,  had  been 
to  gather  an  army  near  Wesel,  where  it  could  protect  that 
comparatively  unready  town,  as  well  as  Cologne  and  the 
Provinces.^  If  Frederick  did  not  wish  this,  he  thought,  appar- 
ently, that  the  willingness  of  the  Elector  Palatine  to  receive 


1  Fridag  to  Leopold,  quoted  in  Haake,  p.  55. 

2  William  to  Waldeck,  Oct  2,  Muller,  II,  p.  111. 


32 


troops  in  Julich  or  Berg,  might  be  considered.  What  Fred- 
erick might  have  desired  at  this  date,  October  2,  is  not  clear. 
But  surely  the  change  in  tone  between  the  instructions  for 
Diest  of  October  3,  and  those  for  Fuchs  five  days  later  is 
marked.  The  former  are  still  very  general  as  far  as  actual 
discussion  of  the  central  question  goes.  Diest  is  to  give  as- 
surance of  Frederick's  desire  for  a  good  understanding,  and 
his  anxiety  over  the  danger  to  Protestantism.  But  Fuchs  was 
to  explain  Frederick's  plan  for  his  own  action,  still  a  defensive 
plan,  to  be  sure,  and  mduce  the  authorities  at  the  Hague  to 
make  a  particular  disposition  of  their  forces.  Frederick's  idea 
required  that  they  place  an  army  between  the  Rhine  and  the 
Maas,  not  far  from  Cologne ;  or  at  least  furnish,  for  this  pur- 
pose, the  Brandenburg  regiments,  tho  the  latter  should  remain 
in  the  service  of  the  Estates,  and  be  supported  by  them.^  When 
Fuchs  proposed  this  station  for  the  army.  Orange  answered 
that  he  had  favored  it  himself,^  but  relinquished  it  when 
Schomberg  pointed  out  that  troops,  so  posted,  would  either 
have  Rheinberg  at  their  back,  or  else  the  enemy  could  easily 
crowd  between  them  and  Cologne.  This  reasoning  Fuchs 
considered  so  forcible  that  he  allowed  the  matter  to  rest  until 
he  received  further  orders,^  for  which,  however,  he  did  not 
wait.* 


1  "Dass  der  Staat  zu  formirung  eine  solchen  armee  nur  wenig- 
stens  unsere  Ihn  zugeschickete  Trouppen  stellen,  und  uns  abfolgen 
lassen  mochte,  Sie  hatten  dennoch  in  dessen  pflichten  stehen  bleiben 
und  anders  nicht  als  zu  bedeckung  und  versicherung  Ihrer  Hochm. 
landen  employerit  werden,  welche  letztere  beide  puncte  er  darumb 
anzufiihren  hat,  damit  der  Staat  demselben  die  ubernommene  verpfle- 
gung  continuiren,  und  Wir  die  mittel  so  dadurch  erspahret  werden,  zu 
anwerbung  und  unterhaltung  mehrer  manschaft  anwenden  konnen." 
Instructions  for  Fuchs,  Sept.  28. 

2  Apparently  some  report  to  this  effect  had  reached  Berlin ;  for  a 
rescript  to  Fuchs  dated  Oct.  7/17,  says,  "Und  weill  man  alhier  schon 
durch  den  Von  Benting  die  nachricht  erhalten,  dass  man  dort  zu  den 
erwusten  campement  inclinire,  also  ist  zu  hoffen  Ihr  werdet  auch  dort 
mit  Gottes  hiilfe ." 

3  Fuchs  from  the  Hague.  Oct.  12/22. 

*  On  Oct.  16/26,  he  was  already  at  Nymegen. 


33 


So  it  was  decided  that  Waldeck  place  the  maiir  field  force 
at  Ruhrort.  Diest,  upon  his  own  initiative,  had  given  many- 
reasons  why  it  should  be  placed  rather  at  Biiderich ;  but  those 
in  authority  considered  their  design  better,  as  affording  the 
same  protection  for  Cleves,  and  giving  Cologne  greater  con- 
fidence. Frederick  too,  for  his  own  reasons,  desired  that  Wal- 
deck's  army  be  advanced  beyond  any  such  position  as  Biiderich. 
In  Diest's  instructions  for  November  6,  he  contends  that  it 
should  be  used  to  clear  the  enemy  from  such  posts  as  Arns- 
berg  and  Werle ;  and  after  being  held  together  until  the  French 
go  into  winter  quarters,  should  be  stationed  along  the  Rhine, 
rather  than  on  the  Yssel  or  Maas.  Thus  tho  Frederick  him- 
self was  not  ready  to  undertake  an  offensive,  he  planned  that 
Waldeck  should  do  so,  even  before  Louis  had  declared  war 
against  the  Netherlands.  While  Diest  broached  this  subject 
at  the  Hague,  Spaen  was  sent  to  Waldeck  on  the  same  mission. 
Fagel's  illness  made  it  impossible  for  him  to  enter  into  the 
matter;  but  Dykvelt  said  that  both  Orange  and  the  Estates 
had  given  Waldeck  authority  to  concert  and  undertake  meas- 
ures against  the  enemy,  to  occupy  places  which  would  protect 
W^estphalia  and  allow  the  aiding  of  Cologne  and  Coblenz,  and 
especially  to  defend  the  Elector's  territories.  Diest  judged, 
however,  that  while  Frederick  could  effect  more  by  dealing 
directlv  with  Waldeck,^  still  the  Provinces  did  not  wish  to 
undertake  anything,  for  the  present,  on  land.  He  thought 
that  the  results  would  be  best  attained  if  Frederick  proceeded 
with  the  desired  preparations  as  a  matter  pertaining  to  the 
Circle,  merely  securing  Dutch  troops  as  auxiliaries.^  But  this 
was  not  at  all  the  Elector's  idea.  He  wished  Waldeck  to  do 
this.     He  himself  could  go  no  farther  without  the  break  with 


1  Diest  to  Frederick,  Nov.  23,  "dan  gewiss  ist  es  dass  E.  C.  D.  viel 
bequamer  die  bekannte  intention  erreichen  werden  wan  Sie  allein  mit 
Sr.  Furstl.  Gnd.  von  Waldeck  tractiren  lassen,  als  wan  dariiber  alhie 
bey  dem  Estat  deliberation  solthe  vorfallen." 

2  Diest  to  Frederick,  Nov,  23,  "wan  es  E.  C.  D.  als  von  Creyses 
wegen  thete  und  dieses  Staets  troupen  nuhr  als  auxiliaire  dahin  deta- 
schiret  werden."    B.  St.  A. 


34 


France,  which  was  more  and  more  imminent.  Besides  he  was 
not  ready  to  take  the  offensive ;  nor  was  he  wilHng  to  give  any 
agent  authority  really  to  conclude  arrangements,  until  he 
had  approved  each  detail.  Waldeck  felt  hampered,  too,  by  his 
military  weakness  and  the  dissensions  at  the  Hague.  He  held 
his  army,  as  late  in  the  season  as  possible,  at  Duisburg,  dis- 
couraging French  raids  in  November.  When  they  threatened 
Cologne,^  he  threw  some  troops  into  that  city,  in  accordance 
with  the  orders  of  Orange.^  He  prepared  to  march  to  the 
relief  of  Diisseldorf,  but  found  it  unnecessary.^  Further  than 
this  he  did  not  feel  able  to  go,  at  least  without  special  author- 
ization. Thus,  before  agreement  was  reached,  the  time  for 
action  had  passed. 

Here  matters  rested  when  the  meeting  at  Wesel  occurred. 
Waldeck  had  feared  to  expect  much  from  this  conference,* 
tho  both  he  and  William  felt  a  definite  concert  with  Branden- 
burg to  be  necessary.  Nor  had  Frederick  been  less  urgent, 
tho  he  certainly  caused  delay  by  his  demands,  and  by  his  in- 
tention of  passing  on  each  step  in  the  negotiations  himself. 
But  the  time  had  now  arrived  when  the  army  must  go  into 
winter  quarters  and  some  mutual  agreement  was  essential. 
At  Wesel,  Frederick,  Waldeck,  the  deputies  of  the  Estates, 
and  the  Brandenburg  ministers  and  commanders,  held  various 
discussions,  between  the  sixth  and  the  twelfth  of  December. 
There,  too,  representatives  of  Cologne  and  the  Elector  Pala- 
tine appear  with  claims  for  aid.  The  result  was  a  conserva- 
tive, and  somewhat  indefinite,  defensive  agreement,  with  which 
Waldeck  seems  fairly  satisfied;  but  which  was  probably  un- 
satisfactory to  Frederick  at  the  time,  and  became  more  so  after 
the  developments  of  the  following  days.     It  was  also  decided 


1  Bilderbreek  to  the  Estates  from  Cologne,  Nov.  16  &  30.    H.  R.  A. 

2  Waldeck  to  the  Estates  from  Duisburg,  Nov.  4/14.    H.  R.  A. 
8  Waldeck  to  the  Estates  from  Duisburg,  Nov.  5/15.    H.  R.  A. 

-*  Waldeck  to  William.  Nov.  13/23,  "le  concert  a  faire  avec  Mr. 
I'Electeur  de  Brandenbourg  sera  un  peu  difficille,  puis  que  Ton  pre- 
tendra  des  choses  que  je  ne  puis  faire."    Muller,  II,  p.  117. 


35 


here,  that,  when  common  action  was  undertaken,  command 
should  remain  with  the  officer  of  highest  rank  in  either  army. 
If  two  officers  were  of  the  same  rank,  precedence  should  fol- 
low the  age  of  their  respective  commissions.^ 

Thus,  until  December,  Frederick  had  done  what  his  own 
central  interest  demanded,  while  still  avoiding  that  complete 
break  with  France,  which  surely  appeared  contrary  to  his 
good,  and  the  advantage  of  which  to  the  common  cause  cannot 
be  proved.  Since  William  and  Waldeck  incline,  for  so  long, 
to  purely  defensive  movements  on  the  Continent,  it  is  difficult 
to  date  their  desire  that  Frederick  discontinue  these  relations. 
At  first  Waldeck,  at  least,  had  feared  that  he  would  move  too 
rapidly  in  breaking  with  the  past.^  There  was  no  outward  sign 
of  desire  for  change,  until  the  negotiations  appeared  to  be 
taking  a  new  and  dangerous  course.  As  long  as  Frederick's 
readiness  for  common  defensive  action  and  agreement  per- 
sisted, the  old  order  of  things,  as  regards  France,  fell  in  well 
enough  with  their  ideas.  So  far  this  intimacy  had  been  prac- 
tical and  diplomatic,  rather  than  logical.  It  was  based  on 
the  quibble  that,  tho  Frederick's  every  important  action  arrayed 
him  with  the  allies,  and  tho  he  was  repeatedly  warned  of  the 
view  which  Louis  must  take,  he  had  never  given  any  cause 
for  offense.  On  the  one  hand  he  acted,  on  the  other  he  cor- 
responded and  explained.  And  he  had  not  neglected  to  act 
because  ''ombrage"  at  Paris  might  result. 

Nor  had  the  relations  with  France  been  particularly  note- 
worthy. In  the  beginning,  largely  thru  trust  in  Rebenac's  good 
offices,^  the  Elector  hoped  to  draw  some  fresh  subsidy  pay- 
ments from  France.  But  it  soon  became  a  mere  question  of 
keeping  the  diplomatic  relations  open  as  long  as  possible.    To 


1  The  protocol  of  what  occurred  at  Wesel  in  the  conference  of  Nov. 
30/Dec.  10,  was  ratified  by  Frederick,  Jan.  26,  1689.    H.  R.  A. 

2  Miiller,  Wilhelm  III  und  Waldeck,  II,  p.  31. 

3  Rebenac  had  hinted  as  early  as  1685  that  some  "solide  proposition" 
ought  to  be  offered  to  Brandenburg,  Urk.  &  Akt,  XX,  1011. 

Frederick  to   Spanheim,  Apr.   30/May   10,   says:     "Insonderheit 


36 


this  end  the  negotiations  for  the  renewal  of  treaties  continued, 
in  the  form  of  more  or  less  consideration  of  Louis'  prelim- 
inary demands.  Also  promptly  and  repeatedly  Spanheim  was 
explaining  Bentinck's  mission  in  June,  the  renewal  of  the 
treaties  with  the  Provinces,  the  meeting  with  Orange  at  Min- 
den,  the  movements  of  Schomberg,  and  like  matters,  which 
taken  together  indicated  clearly  enough  the  aim  of  Branden- 
burg's policy.  But  it  must  be  emphasized  that  not  Louis  alone 
made  preliminary  demands.  There  is  no  sign  that  Frederick 
would  have  considered  a  settlement,  unless  he  first  received 
large  payments ;  and,  even  then,  it  was  to  be  a  new,  purely  de- 
fensive treaty,  which  would  leave  him  unhampered  in  the  actual 
conflict.  Nor  does  he  hesitate  to  express,  in  the  strongest 
terms,  his  disapproval  of  the  policies  of  Louis,  and  the  impos- 
sibility of  any  agreement  unless  France  withdrew  from  her 
extreme  position.^  As  for  Louis,  he  too  had  been  willing  to 
keep  matters  open,  and  doubtless  felt  that  only  loss  could  come 
from  crowding  Brandenburg,  while  there  might  be  gain  in 
waiting.  Neither  considered  that  there  Vvas,  for  the  moment, 
any  chance  of  an  understanding. 

Under  these  circumstances  the  correspondence  dragged  on 
thru  November..  Then  the  balance  of  affairs  began  to  change. 
The  news  from  England  aroused  fears  for  James. ^  The 
strength  of  the  allies,  at  least  defensively,  grew  rapidly  for- 
midable. Frederick  had  started  to  the  West  in  person,  and 
further  regiments  were  on  the  march  to  reinforce  his  army  in 
Cleves.  No  great  prophetic  vision  was  needed  to  enable  Louis 
to  foresee  that  the  Conference  at  Magdeburg  was  about  to  be 
followed  by  a  closer  association  with  the  Netherlands.  The 
time  had  come  when  Brandenburg  must  be  forced  either,  at 


habt  Ihr  auch  mit  gebuhrenden  fleiss  die  zahlung  der  uns  noch  ruck- 
standigen  subsidien  gelder  zu  urgiren  worunter  euch  der  Graff  von 
Rebenac  ausser  zweiffle  gem  an  hand  gehen  und  alle  gute  officia  leisten 
wird." 

1  Frederick  to  Spanheim,  Sept.  28/Oct.  8,  Oct.  21. 

2  Spanheim  to  Frederick,  Nov.  19/29,  and  Nov.  23/Dec.  3.    B.  St.  A. 


37 


least  to  declare  openly  her  neutrality,  or  else  to  accept  the 
dangers  incident  to  hostility.  And  on  the  Elector's  fears  Louis 
hoped  to  build. 

Thus  came  the  December  days  and  the  resulting  accusa- 
tion that  Frederick's  attitude  was  hesitant  and  uncertain.  The 
relations  with  the  Provinces  still  continue  in  their  natural 
course,  tho  affected  in  detail  by  the  new  conditions.  As  re- 
gards France,  the  situation  becomes  more  urgent,  tho  it  may 
reasonably  be  questioned  whether  there  was  much  essential 
vacillation.  It  is  well  to  remember  that  the  Elector  and  his 
advisers  were  not  Really  surprised  by  the  French  attack.  It 
was  inevitable.  After  the  September  Manifesto  there  is  no 
sign  that  they  viewed  the  intercourse  with  Louis  as  anything 
but  temporary.  Meanwhile,  however,  they  expected  to  main- 
tain the  pose  of  complete  innocence  of  offence  toward  that 
King.  It  is  not  possible  to  follow  the  changes  of  Frederick's 
mind,  to  know  in  just  how  large  a  degree  he  may  have  hoped 
for  terms,  or  how  near  success  the  agitation  of  the  French 
party  may  sometimes  have  been.  But  it  is  possible  to  follow 
the  external  course  of  affairs,  and  here  the  wavering  is  super- 
ficial, and  confined  to  uncertainty  as  to  just  how  long  Louis 
would  continue  to  postpone  his  attack. 

Surely  Frederick  felt  the  need  of  extending  this  period  to 
the  best  of  his  ability.  It  was  no  empty  shadow  which  he 
feared.  If  Louis  saw  the  situation  beginning  to  turn  against 
him,  as  early  as  the  end  of  November,  it  was  far  less  easy  for 
the  allies  to  feel  safe.  The  French  devastation,  in  the  Palatin- 
ate, in  Trier,  in  Wiirtemberg,  lay  open  before  their  eyes.  Louis 
was  opposed  by  so  few  troops  that  it  seemed  he  might  break 
out,  with  destructive  force,  at  any  point  he  cared  to  choose. 
Cleves,  west  of  the  Rhine,  lay  particularly  open  to  attack.  He 
felt  that  he  might  frighten  Frederick  with  the  Polish  danger; 
and  it  needed  no  skill  to  show  the  chances  of  an  explosion  in 
the  North,  among  the  smouldering  hostilities  between  Den- 
mark, Sweden,  and  their  allies.  In  fact,  if  his  ability  to  take 
the  offensive  had  approached  his  pretensions,  the  possibilities 


38 


for  him  in  November  seem  endless.  But  Louis'  ability,  such 
as  it  was,  remained  that  of  diplomat,  rather  than  of  statesman 
or  general.  The  explanation  of  his  course  lies  largely  in  the 
hope  of  weaving  victory  out  of  the  tangled  mass  of  negotia- 
tions and  half  measures,  before  a  general  conflagration  de- 
stroyed them.  He  hoped  to  do  just  what  he  claimed  to  be 
doing,  to  secure  peace  by  a  one-sided  war,  after  having  led  up 
to  war  by  a  one-sided  truce. 

Frederick's  view  was,  however,  less  distracted  than  Louis 
had  hoped.  He  well  knew  the  danger  in  the  North,  and  was 
preparing  to  meet  it,  but  believed  it  possible  to  control.  In 
regard  to  Poland  he  remained  less  uneasy  than  might  be  ex- 
pected. The  court  at  Warsaw  was  not  friendly,  and  he  had 
plenty  of  evidence  of  French  efforts  against  him  there. ^  But 
the  state  of  factions  made  any  open  attack  doubtful  and  dis- 
tant, even  tho  he  might  not  succeed  in  placating  the  King  by 
explanations  of  the  disputed  points,  and  by  promises  to  sup- 
port the  election  of  his  son  to  follow  him  on  the  Polish  throne.^ 
Some  danger  there  was  in  the  support  which  Prussian  mal- 
contents might  receive  in  Poland ;  and  Frederick  desired  to  go 
to  Prussia,  that  he  might  receive  the  homage  of  the  Estates, 
and  arrange  matters  there,  especially  in  regard  to  the  revenues. 
It  is  probable,  too,  that  he  felt  increased  concern  just  at  this 
period.  Still  he  evidently  did  not  consider  the  immediate 
danger  to  be  very  great. 

The  real  danger  was  in  the  country  of  the  lower  Rhine. 
The  French  had  left  Coblenz  in  ruins,  and  for  some  months 
thereafter  kept  Cologne  in  continual  fear  of  a  like  fate.  They 
had  demanded  200,000  Reichsthalers  from  Julich,  under 
threat  of  burning,  and  it  was  reported  that  they  expected  to 
raise  1,000,000  from  Julich,  Berg,  Mark,  and  Cleves,  by  this 


1  Wichert  to  Frederick,  Oct.  9,  1688,  and  Nov.  24,  1688.     B.  St.  A. 
Spanheim  to  Frederick,  Nov.  26/Dec.  6,  and  Nov.  30/Dec.  10.    B.  St.  A. 

2  Instructions  and  secret  instructions  for  Dohna  (the  special  agent 
to  Poland  in  these  months),  Oct.  28/ Nov.  7.     B.  St.  A. 


39 


method.^  What  followed  is  clear  enough.  Frederick  and  his 
ministers  were  anticipating  an  attack.  The  French  offensive 
seemed  advancing  northward,  as  well  as  toward  the  East. 
Already,  on  November  14/24,  Spanheim  had  been  told  that  he 
might  prepare  to  leave  Paris  as  soon  as  he  received  orders. 
Then  came  the  suggestions  that  some  arrangement  might  be 
reached  for  sparing  Cleves  thru  the  Winter.^  Spanheim's 
instructions,  of  December  3/13,  were  a  natural  reply  for  Fred- 
erick to  make.  They  emphasize  his  desire  for  peace,  and 
promise  that  he  will,  in  so  far  as  circumstances  allow,  keep  the 
way  open  for  an  agreement  between  France  and  the  Empire, 
not,  however,  on  the  French  basis.  In  return  he  hopes  that 
Cleves  will  be  spared.  These  instructions  were  hardly  on  their 
way,  before  Frederick  learned  of  the  French  demand  for  a 
contribution  from  Cleves.  Possibly,  if  his  new  hope  had  not 
seemed  so  ruthlessly  shattered,  Frederick  might,  from  the  first 
news  of  this  terrorism,  have  taken  the  decision  to  continue 
the  negotiations  as  long  as  he  could.  Disillusionment  may 
have  sharpened  the  tone  of  the  instructions  of  December  5/15, 
by  which  Spanheim  was  commanded  to  leave  Paris  without 
further  orders,  unless  the  demand  were  withdrawn.  Frederick 
probably  felt  that  the  rupture  could  not  be  postponed,  or  at 
least  that  a  daring  stand  was  the  only  chance  to  secure  both 
postponement  and  a  continuation  of  the  positive  side  of  his 
policy.  Soon,  however,  the  hope  which  had  been  held  out  to 
him  returned  to  strengthen  the  tendency  still  to  try  the  effect 
of  negotiation  on  this  new  question.  For  this  was,  from  Fred- 
erick's point  of  view,  hardly  a  continuation  of  the  old  relations. 
They  were  at  an  end.  The  only  question  was  the  possibility 
of  bargaining  for  the  temporary  safety  of  lands  which  he  did 
not  yet  feel  able  to  protect  by  force. 

Aside  from  any  chance  of  success,  he  needed  to  gain  time. 
Many  of  his  troops  were  still  on  the  march.     The  Swedish 


1  Bilderbreek  to  the  Estates  from  Cologne,  Nov.  23,  1688.    H.  R.  A. 

2  Spanheim's  report  of  Nov.  26/Dec.  6.    B.  St  A. 


40 


regiments  had  not  yet  arrived  in  the  Netherlands.  The  existing 
agreement  with  the  Provinces  promised  no  aid  for  the  threat- 
ened district.  Probably,  also,  he  hoped  actually  to  secure  the 
neutrality  of  Cleves  during  the  winter,  and  was  willing  to 
carry  into  effect  the  concessions  mentioned  to  Gravel  ^  and  in 
Spanheim's  instructions.^  If  his  only  aim  had  been  to  gain 
time,  a  very  limited  degree  of  wisdom  would  have  suggested 
taking  some  one  of  his  allies  into  confidence.  Since,  however, 
the  only  concession  which  could  tempt  Louis  was  open  neu- 
trality, the  hope  vanished.  Frederick  would  not  reconsider  this 
question,  unless  the  French  position  altered,  and  refused  their 
propositions  even  more  decisively  than  they  refused  his.  The 
rupture  resulted,  nor  was  it  repaired  by  a  final  effort,  on  the 
part  of  the  French,  to  add  bribes  to  the  pressure  of  Frederick's 
own  fears. 

To  give  an  exact  date  for  the  end  of  these  negotiations  is 
not  possible.    Some  doubt  must  remain  as  to  what  may  be  con- 
cealed in  the  silence  of  the  weeks,  between  Spanheim's  recall 
and  his  withdrawal  from  Paris.    The  most  obvious,  and  also 
the  most  likely,  theory  is  that  Frederick  viewed  the  matter  as 
ended  with  the  recall  of  Spanheim  on  January  5,  but  that  Fuchs 
managed  cleverly  to  delay  the  final  answer  to  Gravel,  and  that 
Spanheim  took  the  responsibility  of  awaiting  further  orders, 
because  of  the  new  offers  from  the  French.    Certainly  Croissy, 
and  Gravel,  gave  Frederick  ample  opportunity  for  more  corre- 
spondence, had  he  desired.    On  the  whole,  Frederick's  waver- 
ing seems,  then,  to  be  confined  to  the  fact  that  he  went  rather 
further  than  was  wise,  from  the  point  of  view  of  his  policy,  in 
Spanheim's  instructions  of  December  5/15,  and  later  with- 
drew, for  a  short  period,  from  this  position.     More  correctly 
stated,   one   set   of   negotiations    was   ended   by   the    French 
"Brandbrieven,"  and  a  new  and  much  narrower  transaction 
results. 


1  The  French  agent  at  Frederick's  court  since  the  recall  of  Rebenae. 

2  Dec.  10/20,  and  Dec.  12/22. 


41 


Circumstances  were  thus  undergoing  a  considerable 
change,  from  Frederick's  standpoint,  since  the  interviews  at 
Wesel.  On  December  15  he  wrote  Spanheim  that  he  had  never 
done  anything  "welches  auch  nur  den  schein  einer  hostilitat 
haben  konte."  He  had  hoped  to  extend  this  attitude,  since  the 
position  of  the  Upper-German  powers  was  still  undefined, 
effective  military  support  from  the  Protestant  allies  doubtful, 
and  MiAnster  wavered  without  end.  But  now,  tho  he  turned 
for  a  time  to  the  propositions  for  the  neutrality  of  Cleves,  his 
attention  to  military  preparations  have  a  no  less  evident,  and 
a  more  logical  and  permanent  place  in  his  policy.  This  latest 
experiment  with  France,  and  the  resulting  doubt  of  his  inten- 
tions on  the  part  of  his  allies,  influence  only  the  details  of  his 
relations  with  the  Netherlands,  while  their  main  tendencies 
continue  unchanged.^ 

The  agents  of  the  Estates  left  Wesel  on  the  twelfth  of 
December,  and  Waldeck  followed  on  the  fourteenth.  The 
next  day  came  the  news  of  the  French  requisition,  and  the  at- 
tempt to  put  off  the  evil  day  resulted.  At  the  same  time  Fred- 
erick hurried  the  march  of  his  troops,  the  construction  of 
bridges  at  Wesel,  the  establishment  of  cavalry  patrols  on  the 
left  of  the  Rhine,^  and  urged  new  measures  at  the  Hague,  pre- 
paratory to  his  own  visit  there.  He  determined  to  post  all  pos- 
sible troops  in  the  neighborhood  of  Wesel,  so  that  an  army  of 
from  ten  to  fifteen  thousand  could  be  brought  together  within 
twenty-four  hours.  Diest  was  to  communicate  this  intention, 
to  the  Estates,  with  the  suggestion  that  Cologne  be  advised  to 
accept  neutrality,  since  Frederick  would  need  his  troops  now 
stationed  in  that  city.  If  he  met  opposition  upon  this  point, 
Diest  should  proceed  to  demand  that  two  additional  regiments 
be   camped  on  the  Yssel,   and   should   secure  a   speedy   and 


1  On  Frederick's  relations  with  France  compare  Meinecke :  Bran- 
denburg und  Frankreich  1688  (Historische  Zeitschrift.  Bd.  62). 

2  Haake,  p.  69. 


42 


categorical  answer.^ 

When  Diest  discussed  these  proposals  with  the  committee 
appointed  for  conference,^  they  objected  strongly  to  the  first 
plan,  as  Cologne  would  no  more  remain  neutral  than  Mainz 
had  done,  when  it  fell  under  French  control.  Indeed  they 
expressed  the  intention  of  increasing  the  Dutch  contingent  in 
Cologne.  The  reinforcement  of  Schlangenburg,  who  com- 
manded on  the  Yssel,  they  promised  to  take  up  with  Waldeck. 
Waldeck  told  Diest  that  he  had  supposed  that  the  position  of 
the  troops  had  been  finally  arranged  at  Wesel,  but  that  he 
would  see  what  changes  could  be  made.  A  few  days  later  a 
decision,  partly  meeting  Frederick's  demands,  was  reached.^ 
The  Estates  already  knew  of  the  propositions  for  the  neutrality 
of  Cologne,  and  were  exerting  every  influence  against  their 
acceptance.*  It  is  likely  that  this  was  what  Frederick  expected, 
and  that  additional  force  on  the  Yssel  was  his  real  aim.  This 
is  in  complete  accord  with  his  policy,  both  before  and  after; 
and  Diest  certainly  understood  the  matter  thus,  for  he  brought 
up  first  the  withdrawal  of  the  garrison  from  Cologne,  using 
that  as  a  background  for  the  other  plan.  If  his  aim  had  been 
to  carry  thru  the  Cologne  matter,  the  order  and  the  method  of 
discussion  would  have  been  dififerent.  Frederick,  too,  dropped 
the  matter  except  to  urge  the  speedy  completion  of  the  promise 
to  reinforce  the  garrison,  as  he  considered  Cologne  in  great 
immediate  danger.  A  few  days  later  he  was  himself  at  the 
Hague ;  and,  while  the  news  from  Paris  brought  the  old  order 
to  a  close,  that  from  London  and  Vienna  robbed  the  new  of  its 
worst  terrors. 

This  journey,  which  had  been  under  consideration  for 
some  time,  was  explained  in  a  variety  of  ways.      Frederick 


1  Frederick  to  Diest,  Dec.  7/17. 

2  Diest  to  Frederick,  Dec.  11/21. 
8  Diest  to  Frederick,  Dec.  14/24. 

*  Report  of  Bilderbreek  to  the  Estates,  from  Cologne,  Dec.  28. 


43 


wrote  to  William  that  he  was  following  his  suggestion,^  to 
Mary  that  he  desired  to  make  her  his  compliments  in  person,^ 
to  Spanheim  that  he  wished  the  Electress  to  see  the  Nether- 
lands, as  she  had  never  before  had  an  opportunity.^  Waldeck 
urged  the  visit,*  probably  in  order  to  draw  him  away  from 
Gravel  and  the  French  party.  Frederick,  himself,  may  have 
desired,  originally,  to  further  the  matter  of  a  loan,  and  to  feel 
the  ground  as  to  the  possibility  of  extending  his  personal  influ- 
ence in  the  Netherlands.  Between  December  7,  when  the  letter 
to  Mary  gives  the  first  news  of  his  intentions,  and  December 
30,  when  he  left  Wesel,  matters  had,  however,  moved  rapidly; 
and  his  chief  traceable  interest  becomes  the  conference  on  mili- 
tary affairs.  '  The  question  of  the  neutrality  of  Cleves  played 
no  visible  part.  The  journey  was  determined  upon  before  this 
matter  came  to  the  front,  and  it  is  evident  later  that  his  allies 
are  informed  by  others  of  these  negotiations.  Consequently 
doubt  of  Frederick  took  root,  a  danger  to  which  he  could  not 
have  been  blind,^  tho  he  trusted,  as  usual,  to  later  explanations 
for  its  removal.  Here  lies  the  strongest  reason  for  believing 
that  the  French  negotiation  must  have  been  more  than  a  mere 
plan  to  gain  time,  that  he  retained  some  hope  of  success.  But 
this  meant  in  his  mind,  at  least  so  long  as  he  was  the  other 
party  to  the  contract,  no  sacrifice  of  the  cause. 

Regarding  Frederick's  desire  to  extend  his  influence  in  the 
Netherlands,  the  information  is  scattering.     Necessity  made  it 


1  Frederick  to  William,  Jan.  3,  1689,  from  the  Hague.  "Seit  dem 
nun  babe  ich  der  mit  Ew.  Hoheit  genommene  abrede  zufolge  meine 
reyse  ferner  anhero  fortgesetzt." 

2  Frederick  to  Mary,  Nov.  27/Dec.  7,  1688.    B.  St.  A. 

3  Frederick  to  Spanheim,  Dec.  18/28,  "umb  unsere  Herzgeliebten 
Gemahlinnen — welche  selbige  Provintzien  annoch  nicht  gesehen  die- 
selbe  zu  zeigen." 

*  Waldeck  to  William,  Dec.  28.    Miiller,  II,  p.  123. 

5  Compare,  for  instance,  the  rescript  to  Spanheim,  Dec.  3/13,  "doch 
alles  mit  solcher  behutsamkeiht  damit  der  aldort  noch  anwesende  Am- 
bas.  von  Hog.  Mog.  und  andere  wohlintentionirte  keine  ungleiche 
opinion  deshalb  von  uns  nehmen." 


44 


a  very  secret  matter.  The  urgency  of  passing  ev^ents,  the  judg- 
ment of  Frederick  or  his  advisers,  crowd  it  somewhat  into  the 
background.  But  there  can  be  no  doubt  that,  originally,  he 
had  many  plans,  probably  learned  in  part  from  the  old  Elector, 
as  to  the  possibilities  offered  by  the  situation,  for  increasing 
his  importance  at  many  points.^  It  was,  however,  thru  the 
absence  of  Orange  that  he  hoped  especially  to  raise  himself  to 
a  leading  position  in  western  Europe.  He  felt  that  someone, 
and  naturally  none  but  himself,  must  take  William's  place  on 
the  Continent.  Probably  some  secret  steps  were  taken  in  this 
direction  at  the  Hague,  tho  Frederick  instructs  Diest  and  Spaen 
to  explain  that  such  reports  were  mere  inventions  of  the 
French  agents.^    At  any  rate  the  instructions  for  Schmettau  ^ 


^  Compare,  for  instance,  a  report  of  Fuchs,  from  the  Hague,  Oct. 
12/22,  in  which  he  suggests  placing  5000  or  6000  troops  on  the  middle 
Rhine,  in  order  to  increase  Brandenburg's  importance  with  the  Empire 
and  the  Emperor.    B.  St.  A. 

2  Frederick  to  Diest,  Feb.  1/11.  "Wir  geben  euch  auch  wiewohl 
in  hochsten  geheimb  zu  vernehmen  was  massen  uns  gantz  neulich 
unter  andern  advantageusen  conditionen  so  uns  Frankreich  offeriren 
lassen — auch  dies  gewesen  dass  sie  uns  zum  gouvernement  in  denen 
Niederlandischen  provincien  beforderlich  seyn  wolten,  Nuhn  haben 
wir  alle  solche  offerten  hautement  verworfen  und  synd  bestandigh 
entschlossen  bey  der  guthen  Parthey  zuleben  and  zusterben.  Weilen 
aber  zu  besorgen  es  mochte  Frankreich  diess  bey  den  Staat  und  in 
England  unter  handt  dargestalts  vorstellen  lassen,  als  hetten  wir 
unser  gedanken  auf  besagten  gouvernement  gerichtet  umb  dadurch 
ombrage  und  jalousie  unter  der  guthen  parthey  anzurichten,  so  habet 
ihr  dem  Rath.  Pen.  wie  wohl  in  vertrauen  hievon  nachricht  zugeben 
und  so  wohl  bey  demselben  als  auch  sonsten  wan  etwa  davon  gesprochen 
solthe  werden  zu  contestiren  dass  uns  dergleichen  niemahlen  in  die 
g:<idanken  kommen,  zugeschweigen  dass  wir  jemahls  eintzige  proposi- 
tions desshalb  an  Frankreich  hetten  thuen  lassen  noch  auch  Frankreich 
an  uns,  und  wurde  vieleicht  was  bey  jiingsten  unser  anwesenheit  in 
Holland  unter  der  handt  ausgesprenget  worden  ob  wohlten  wir  so 
lange  daselbst  verbleiben  bis  des  Princen  Lbd.  wiederkeme,  aus  eben 
dem  frantzosischen  artificio  herruhren  daher  wir  dann  hoffen  wolten 
man  wurde  demselben  keinen  glauben  bey  messen."    B.  St.  A. 

8  Feb.  19,  1968.    B.  St.  A. 


show,  more  in  detail,  a  part  of  his  hope.  Here  he  proposes 
that,  if  William  can  not  return  to  the  Continent,  some  oiher 
ought,  even  for  his  own  good,  to  become  Stadtholder.  For 
this  position,  under  the  regency  of  one  of  his  younger  brothers, 
the  Elector  suggests  his  own  unborn  second  son.  There  is 
also  a  hint,  of  these  days,  that  Frederick  had  some  thought  of 
a  return  to  the  Netherlands  in  an  undfined  but  important 
capacity.^  How  far  his  dreams  may  have  reached,  it  is  not 
possible  to  say. 

■  Meanwhile  the  doubt  in  regard  to  his  intentions  had  not 
diminished,  and  there  were  many  who  found  it  to  their  advan- 
tage to  spread  suspicion  among  the  allies.  In  January  the  in- 
terest of  the  Estates  in  the  neutrality  negotiations  appear  in 
two  separate  instructions  to  Ham,  as  a  result  of  which  he 
questioned  Fuchs  and  Dankelmann  on  the  twelfth,  and  a  few 
days  later  talked  with  the  Elector  himself.  The  result  was  the 
same  in  each  case.  The  desire  to  gain  time  is  the  explanation 
given,  together  with  the  statement  that  the  negotiations  are  at 
an  end.^  As  proof  a  copy  of  the  order  to  Schoning,  to  make 
requisitions  in  Cologne,  was  given  to  Ham.  A  like  explana- 
tion was  made  to  the  German  allies,  when  they  complain  of 
the  same  rumours.^  For  even  a  longer  period  the  interest  in 
Frederick's  personal  movements  continued  to  form  a  chief 
point  of  the  intercourse  initiated  by  the  Estates  and  William.* 
The  desire  of  the  autumn,  that  Frederick  should  come  to  the 


1  Zeitung  from  Minden,  Jan.  13/23.  "Es  seindt  auch  vielfaltige 
instances  bey  deroselben  geschehen  alldar  zu  residiren  und  sich  der 
protection  des  Landes  bey  diesen  gefahrlichen  zeiten  anzunehmen 
welches  S.  C.  D.  endlich  mit  der  zugebenen  Hoffnung  einer  schleunigen 
wiederkunfft  abgelehnt."  The  words  "mit — Hoffnung"  were  originally 
written  "mit  dem  versprechen",  which  strengthens  the  feeling  that 
there  was  much  here  which  remains  dark. 

2  Reports  of  Ham,  Jan.  8/18,  1689,  and  Jan.  3/13,  1689. 

3  Report  of  Ham,  Jan.  11/21,  1689. 

*  Ham  is  constantly  reporting  upon  this  question  thruout  Decem- 
ber to  April. 

William  to  Waldeck,  Jan.   1/11,  "Si  Mr.  I'Electeur  de  Branden- 


46 


West,  found  its  sequel  in  the  repeated  demand  that  he  should 
not  go  to  Prussia  during  the  Winter.  The  journey  was  post- 
poned from  time  to  time  but,  not  until  April,  does  Ham  feel 
that  it  will  not  take  place. 

While  the  Elector  was  in  Holland  the  new  conferences  on 
military  affairs  occurred.^  Frederick's  promises,  made  at 
Wesel,  were  renewed.  The  protection  of  Wesel  was  provided 
for,  as  also  the  reinforcing  of  the  garrison  at  Cologne  by  Bran- 
denburg troops.  Their  place  at  Wesel  was  to  be  taken  by 
forces  of  the  Provinces.  It  was  further  provided  that  Fred- 
erick's army  should  be  at  Waldeck's  service,  if  common  action 
seemed  advisable  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Rhine.  Nothing, 
however,  was  arranged  as  to  the  protection,  under  all  circum- 
stances, of  the  threatened  portion  of  Cleves.  The  matter  was 
left  to  decision  when  the  case  should  arise.  It  must  be  remem- 
bered that  the  Provinces  were,  themselves,  expecting  a  direct 
attack  at  this  time,  that  they  felt  the  need  of  considering  the 
protection  of  the  Spanish  Netherlands  as  well  as  of  Cleves, 
and  that  they  wished  to  wait  until  their  forces  reached  their 
full  strength,  before  engaging  themselves  too  deeply.  Wal- 
deck,  too,  tho  he  realized  the  need  of  doing  what  was  necessary 
to  keep  Frederick  from  dissatisfaction,^  felt  that  he  was  prone 
to  constant  demands  for  help,^  while  he  had,  at  the  same  time, 
been  careless  and  tardy  in  his  own  preparations  ;*  and  Waldeck 
probably  thought  that  too  much  readiness  to  aid,  on  the  part  of 
his  allies,  would  only  increase  the  Elector's  delay. 

Thus  the  conference  had  left  Brandenburg  still  unsatisfied. 
Three  days  after  its  conclusion  Frederick  was  already  seeking 


bourg  est  encore  a  la  Haye  au  nom  de  Dieu  tasches  a  le  de  tourner 
de  son  voyage  de  Prusse,  il  expose  tout  sans  necessite,  voila  encore 
des  effects  des  conseils  corrompus  par  I'argent  de  la  France."  Miiller 
II,  p.  128. 

1  Protocol  of  the  conferences  of  Jan.  5  and  Jan.  9.    H.  R.  A. 

2  Waldeck  to  William,  Jan.  28,  1689.     Miiller,  II,  p.  130. 

3  Waldeck  to  William,  Nov.  23,  and  Dec.  28.    Miiller. 
*  Waldeck  to  William,  Dec.  28,  and  Dec.  9.    Muller. 


47 


his  ends  by  other  means.  Since,  in  the  previous  promises  as 
regards  aid  for  Wesel,  "dabey  gefuget  so  viele  die  forces  des 
Staats  es  zulassen  welches  etwas  general,"  ^  therefore  Diest 
was  to  ask  that  Schlangenburg  be  at  once  reinforced  until  he 
had  not  less  than  6000,  and  be  ordered  to  join  Schoning  on 
demand.  Also  the  Provinces  ought  to  place  stores  at  Wesel, 
for  the  support  of  their  troops.  To  a  portion  of  this  request 
Waldeck  and  the  Estates  decided  to  agree.^  They  promised 
both  the  regiments  and  the  orders  for  Schlangenburg.  The 
meeting,  between  Waldeck  and  Barfus  at  Arnhem,  probably 
completed  these  concessions,  which  were  made,  in  part  at  least, 
thru  fear  that  Frederick  might  still  be  prevailed  upon  to  accept 
neutrality.^  Regarding  the  stores  at  Wesel,  Waldeck  however 
reminded  Diest  that,  according  to  the  concert,  such  prepara- 
tions east  of  the  Rhine  should  be  made  by  Brandenburg.*  He 
added  that  many  complaints  were  coming  to  him  of  the  low 
state  of  supplies  there.  Diest  and  Frederick  both  declared  that 
he  had  been  misinformed,  tho  Schoning  was  complaining  of 
serious  lack  of  stores." 

This  was  the  beginning  of  a  long  series  of  demands,  by 
which  Frederick  sought  to  acquire  Dutch  troops.  His  first 
aim  was  to  persuade  Waldeck  and  the  Estates  constantly  to  re- 
inforce Schlangenburg  and  Nymegen,  by  moving  their  troops, 
and  stationing  there  the  Swedish  regiments,  and  those  return- 


1  Frederick  to  Diest,  from  Amsterdam,  Jan.  2/12.  Diest  is  to  ask 
that  Schlangenburg  be  reinforced  to  6000,  "und  er  beordret  werde 
mit  demselben  so  balde  unser  Gen.  Feldm.  Lieut,  begehren  wird 
zu  ihm  zustossen — Es  wurde  aber  solchen  falles  der  Staat  einig 
magasin  so  wohl  aufs  Issel  als  auch  in  Wesel  selber — formiren 
mussen."     B.   St.  A. 

2  Diest  to  Frederick,  Jan.  8/18,  and  Jan.  11/21,  1689 

3  Waldeck  to  William,  Jan.  28.  "je  joint  icy  la  disposition  qu'il 
m'a  fallu  faire  avec  Mr.  Schoning  ce  qui  m'occupe  bien  des  trouppes 
mais  sans  cela  il  auroit  fort  seconde  les  sentiments  de  la  neutralite." 
Miiller,  II,  p.  131. 

4  Diest  to  Frederick,  Jan.  11/21. 

5  Schoning  to  Frederick,  Dec.  27/Jan.  6,  Jan.  4/14,  Jan.  12/22. 


48 


ing  from  England.  Secondly  he  hoped  to  secure  the  use  of  a 
large  portion  of  these  forces  for  his  own  plans,  defensive  and 
offensive.  Primarily  he  aimed  to  provide  definitely  for  the 
protection  of  his  own  lands,  including  the  much  discussed 
Cleves,  west  of  the  Rhine.  Also  he  wished  thoroughly  to  safe- 
guard Cologne.  But  as  the  weeks  pass  without  French  move- 
ments of  importance,  he  turned  to  aggressive  plans  for  clearing 
the  country  below  Cologne,  in  preparation  for  the  main  cam- 
paign. Similar  ideas  he  had  expressed  in  November.  Now, 
however,  he  himself  was  ready  to  take  an  active  part.  The 
allied  forces  were  increasing.  The  news  from  England  was 
encouraging.  The  latest  meeting  with  the  Landgrave  of 
Piesse-Cassel  at  Minden,  and  with  the  heads  of  the  House  of 
Brunswick  at  Hanover,  promised  a  further  advance  on  the 
part  of  the  allies  of  the  Magdeburg  Conference.  Then,  too, 
the  French  were  weakened  by  the  English  developments.  And 
the  south  German  forces  were  gathering. 

Thus,  on  January  thirtieth,  he  was  already  planning  to 
drive  the  enemy  from  Berg  and  Westphalia,  and  wished  Wal- 
deck  to  hurry  the  promised  forces  to  the  Yssel,  and  to 
Strengthen  the  garrison  of  Cologne.^  On  the  fourth  of  Feb- 
ruary, he  wrote  Diest  to  demand,  for  Schoning,  the  support  of 
Schlangenburg  and  the  garrison  of  Nymegen,  if  the  French 
attempted  anything  in  Cleves.^  His  aim  was  to  secure  the 
protection  of  his  territories,  west  of  the  Rhine,  by  the  Dutch, 
while  keeping  his  own  army  very  largely  at  Wesel."^  On  the 
twentieth,  the  French  having  at  last  attempted  some  raids,  he 
asked  that  Schlangenburg  and  Aylva  be  ordered  to  join  Schon- 
ing at  once,  and  aid  him  to  carry  out  his  orders  to  defend  the 


1  Frederick  to  Diest,  from  Hanover,  Jan.  20/30,  1689. 

2  Jan.  25/Feb.  4.  Diest  is  to  see  that,  if  anything  is  attempted  by 
the  French  "alsdann  unserm  dem  von  Schoning  alsofort  auf  seine 
requisition  nicht  allein  von  dem  corpo  so  unter  dem  General  Major 
Schlangenburg  an  der  Issel  stehet  sondern  auch  von  der  guarnison 
aus   Nimwegen  alle  mogliche  assistens  darwider  geleistet." 

3  Diest  to  Frederick,  Feb.  11/21. 


49 


threatened  districts,  and  to  advance  to  the  support  of  Julich 
and  Dusseldorf.^  Barfus  arrived  in  the  Hague,  on  the  twenty- 
first,  to  urge  these  same  measures.^  In  the  first  days  of 
March,^  Frederick  was  still  emphasizing  the  clearing  of  the 
enemy  from  the  east  side  of  the  Rhine,  and  on  the  west  the 
protection  of  Cleves,  the  raid  into  Cologne,  and  the  crippling 
of  the  French  outposts. 

On  these  various  points  Waldeck  took  a  cautious  stand  in 
which  he  was  supported  by  William  and  the  Estates/  He 
expressed  his  willingness  to  support  Schoning  when  the  com- 
mon good  demanded ;  but,  at  least  until  January  twentieth,  he 
was  expecting  a  direct  attack  on  the  Netherlands.  He  thought 
that  it  had  been  agreed,  and  wisely  agreed,  at  Wesel  and  the 
Hague,  that  the  west  side  of  the  Rhine  could  not  be  fully  pro- 
tected.^ He  did  not  believe  in  spending  force  on  preliminary 
movements,  especially  those  suggested  by  Frederick,  in  the  then 
existing  state  of  the  weather  and  the  roads.  He  felt  that  only 
gain  could  result  from  waiting  for  the  English  regiments,  the 
troops  of  Munster,  and  other  additions  to  the  fighting  strength. 
He  refused  to  sanction  the  use  of  his  forces  on  the  east  side  of 
the  Rhine,^  and  this  decision  Frederick  accepted.'^  Nor  was  he 
willing  to  place  more  men  in  Cologne,  or  further  to  reinforce 
Schlangenburg,^  who  was  at  best  a  very  unruly  and  unreliable 
subordinate.^    He  found  it  neither  possible,  nor  wise,  to  make 


1  Frederick  to  Diest,  Feb.  10/20,  and  Feb.  12/22. 

2  Diest  to  Frederick,  Reb.  12/22. 

3  Frederick  to  Diest,  Feb.  20/Mar.  2. 

*  Diest  to  Frederick,  Feb.  8/18.  Waldeck  expresses  himself  as  to 
Frederick's  plans,  and  adds,  "zumahlen  dan  Sr.  Hoheit  der  Printz 
von  Oranien  noch  dieser  post  geschrieben  dass  man  sich  nicht  ahn 
kleyne  sachen  attachiren  und  beym  anfang  der  Campagne  desswegen 
exponiren  mogte." 

5  Diest  to  Frederick,  Feb.  18/28. 

8  Diest  to  Frederick,  Feb.  5/15. 

7  Frederick  to  Diest,  Feb.  13/23. 

8  Diest  to  Frederick,  Feb.  8/18. 

9  Miiller,  II,  p.  46. 


50 


the  desired  arrangements  for  the  protection  of  Cleves  or  to 
place  Schlangenburg  and  Aylva  at  the  service  of  Schoning, 
without  conditions.  Very  Hkely  he  was  already  conscious  of 
the  tendency  on  the  part  of  Brandenburg/  of  which  he  com- 
plained so  strongly  later,^  to  seek  temporary  reinforcements,  on 
various  pretexts,  which  they  then  sought  to  keep  indefinitely. 
These  decisions  the  Elector  seeks  persistently  to  alter.  Wal- 
deck  did,  however,  send  Aylva,  with  a  small  force,  into  Cleves 
to  do  what  could  be  done,  and  agreed  to  leave  him  there  as 
long  as  possible.  Also  he  sent  one  thousand  men  to  Julich. 
Finally,  much  against  his  judgment,^  he  allowed  Aylva  to  join 
Schoning  in  the  expedition,  into  Cologne  and  Julich,  which  re- 
,  suited  in  the  engagement  at  Urdingen,  and  the  withdrawal  of 
the  French  from  all  their  minor  outposts. 

During  this  period  some  other  matters  were  taken  up. 
The  question  of  the  loan  of  200,000  Reichsthalers,  on  which  a 
decision  was  repeatedly  promised,  dragged  on  from  early  De- 
cember until  April.  The  loan  formed  part  of  Frederick's 
whole  financial  scheme.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  financial 
pressure  was  becoming  noticeable.  As  in  the  case  of  Hesse- 
Cassel  and  Brunswick,  the  Brandenburg  troops  had  been  trans- 
ferred to  the  Provinces  without  subsidy  agreements.  The 
revenues  of  Prussia  were  not  immediately  forthcoming.  The 
expenses  were  considerable.  Thus  every  source  of  saving  and 
profit  was  watched.  The  Provinces  were  not  pressed  for  sub- 
sidies.   Those  Frederick  expected  to  draw  from  England.    In 


1  Waldeck  to  William,  Feb.  2/12.    Muller,  II,  p.  134. 

2Walcleck  to  William,  May  8,  1689.  'The  Elector  of  Branden- 
burg hinders  me  very  much  by  retaining  with  him  2000  horse  and  a 
large  body  of  infantry,  belonging  to  the  States."  Domestic  Calender, 
William  and  Mary,  Vol.  I,  p.  80.    Compare  also  pp.  101,  142. 

3  Waldeck  to  William,  Mar.  5,  1689.  "M.  I'Electeur  de  Brande- 
bourg  a  tant  presse  M.  le  General  Schoning  que  contre  tout  raison  et 
sans  estre  en  estat  de  rien  faire  il  fait  la  marche  dans  la  pays  de 
Cologne  avec  4000  hommes."  See  too,  Waldeck  to  William  Feb.  25, 
1689.     Both  in  Muller. 


51 


the  Netherlands  he  sought  loans,  exemption  from  customs,  and 
prompt  payment  of  obligations.  He  urged  that  they  store  sup- 
plies for  the  support  of  such  of  their  troops  as  might  come  into 
his  lands,  and  under  his  orders.  He  asked  them  to  pay  at  once, 
instead  of  in  three  months,  for  forage  purchased  from  his  sub- 
jects in  Cleves.  But  one  thing  is  noticeable.  Nowhere  in  these 
first  critical  months,  is  there  a  sign  of  bargaining  as  to  his 
main  position. 

Upon  the  correspondence,  between  Waldeck  and  Fiirsten- 
berg's  general  Bemsau,  regarding  mutual  sparing  of  Cologne 
and  the  Provinces,  complaints  and  explanations  were  carried 
on,  long  after  the  matter  itself  had  been  entirely  given  up.^ 
Its  chief  interest  is  the  extreme  indignation  of  Frederick  to- 
ward a  negotiation  similar  to,  but  much  more  harmless  than 
his  own  of  December,  when  an  ally  was  concerned  instead  of 
himself.  The  plan  for  placing  a  Brandenburg  garrison  in 
Gelders,  which  Waldeck  gladly  furthered,  was  brought  to 
completion  in  March.  Frederick's  anxiety  over  Denmark,  and 
his  wish  to  secure  general  conferences,  at  Vienna  and  the 
Hague,  upon  the  coming  campaign,  also  became  apparent  in 
February  and  March.  Some  lesser  matters,  such  as  his  dis- 
satisfaction that  Mary  was  called  to  England,  are  of  no  great 
importance. 

In  reviewing  the  foregoing,  it  does  not  seem  either  that 
Frederick  lacked  independence,  or  that  he  had  shown  any 
spirit  of  sacrifice.  It  is  a  noticeable  feature  of  his  relations 
both  with  Orange  and  the  Estates  that,  after  the  two  treaties  of 
the  summer  of  1688,  Frederick  takes  the  initiative  in  most  of 
the  intercourse.  At  very  few  points  does  the  pressure  come 
from  the  other  side.  But  Frederick  is  never  content.  His 
demands  for  aid  both  in  defensive  and  offensive  plans  were 
constant,  and  several  of  them  he  carried  thru,  partly  in  the 


iDiest  to  Frederick,  Feb.  8/18,  Feb.  11/21,  Feb.  18/28,  Mar. 
1/11,  Mar.  8.  Frederick  to  Diest,  Feb.  13/23,  Feb.  20,  Mar.  10/20. 
Ham  to  the  Estates,  Feb.  13/23,  Mar.  2,  Mar.  10. 


52 


face  of  Waldeck's  contrary  judgment.  As  for  sacrifice,  he 
and  his  ministers  watched  every  detail  to  see  that  in  no  way 
should  his  lands,  or  his  revenues,  contribute  anything  which 
could  be  avoided.  Furthermore,  while  the  other  allies  were, 
generally  speaking,  satisfied  if  the  ofifensive  of  Louis  were 
broken,  or  with  the  usual  subsidy  agreements,  Frederick  had 
many  a  thought  of  gains  of  a  more  positive  and  lasting  nature. 
They  were  not  always  wise.  He  doubtless  valued  his  own  im- 
portance and  capacities  too  highly,  and  failed  correctly  to  esti- 
mate the  whole  situation.  But,  without  these  dreams,  his 
actions  would  be  difficult  of  explanation. 

After  Fuchs  left  William  in  October,  the  important  inter- 
course between  the  two  princes  ceased  for  a  time.  Frederick 
had,  however,  several  correspondents  in  England,  among  them 
William  him.self,  Schomberg  and  Bentinck;  while  the  reports 
of  Bonnet  continue  in  their  usual  voluminous  fashion.  When 
news  of  the  landing  reached  him,  he  determined  to  send 
d'Espense  with  congratulations,^  and  possibly  with  some  fur- 
ther secret  instructions.^  But  the  first  mission  of  traceable 
importance  was  that  of  Spaen.^  He  carried  Frederick's  ex- 
planation of  the  intercourse  with  France.  He  was  to  urge 
that,  since  the  English  affair  had  prospered,  and  depended 
largely  on  Continental  conditions,  England  should  declare  war 
and  return,  under  Schomberg's  command,  a  large  part  of  the 
army.  Also  he  must  seek  subsidies.  Frederick  felt  that  the 
English  ought  easily  to  agree  to  them,  if  shown  how  much  he 
had  done  for  them,  and  how  much  more  he  could  do,  if  prop- 
erly supplied.  Thus  Frederick  returns  to  the  demand  which 
had  been  allowed  to  slip  into  the  background  at  the  time  of  the 
Fuchs-Bentinck  meeting.  It  would  not  seem  to  have  been 
mentioned  meanwhile.    The  mission  of  Fuchs  in  October  con- 


^  Instructions  and  credentials  for  d'Espense,  Minden.  Nov    17/27. 
2  Ham  reports,  Nov.  20/30,  "Ich  verneme  van  goeden  handt  dat 
gem.    Heer  Graef  bij  secrete  instructie  gelast  is."    H.  R.  A. 
8  His  instructions  are  dated  Dec.  29/Jan.  8  and  Jan.  1/11. 


53 


tains  no  such  suggestion.  Nor,  in  the  course  of  the  long  ne- 
gotiations which  now  follow,  did  Frederick  claim  that  promises 
had  been  made  to  him.  In  any  case,  it  was  only  after  the 
break  with  France  that  he  could  actually  expect  subsidies. 

In  the  mission  of  Spaen  a  great  difference  in  the  view- 
points of  the  two  princes  first  openly  appears,  tho  Waldeck, 
commenting  on  Schmettau's  instructions,  stated  the  matter 
more  clearly  a  little  later.  In  William's  mind  the  opposition  to 
Louis  was  a  unified  whole,  in  which  the  greatest  interest  of 
each  of  the  allies  w^as  involved,  and  for  participation  in  which, 
they  should  not,  ipso  facto,  expect  reward  from  him.  Fred- 
erick, while  he  had  entered  on  this  plan  for  his  own  sake,  and 
because  of  deep-seated  religious  and  political  beliefs,  felt  that 
William,  thru  his  aid,  had  achieved  a  great  personal  triumph, 
that  England  had  been  rescued,  and  that  he,  Frederick,  ought 
to  receive  some  immediate  material  advantage.  He  feared,  too, 
that  William  might  forget  the  need  of  the  mainland.  It  was 
not  possible  for  him  to  realize  that,  for  William,  the  English 
expedition  was  only  a  first  step  in  a  new  struggle.  Nor  is  it 
surprising  that  he  expected  his  services  to  find  practical  recog- 
tion,  when  one  considers  the  homage  he  received.^ 

In  reply  to  Spaen's  mission,  troops  were  promised  readily 
enough.  In  fact  Schomberg,  in  a  very  sanguine  letter,  perhaps 
intended  to  keep  Frederick  in  the  right  path,  had  already  prom- 
ised the  speedy  return  of  10,000  men.^  The  time  did  not,  how- 
ever, seem  propitious  for  granting  subsidies,  tho  the  question 
was  not  passed  off  as  quickly  as  Pufendorf  seems  to  imply. 
The  demands  continued  without  interruption,  during  the  com- 


1  Fuchs  wrote  Frederick,  Oct.  16/26,  that  Dykvelt  says,  "der  Staat 
nachst  Gott  sein  hogstes  vertrauen  entzigh  und  alleine  auff  E.  C.  D. 
gerichet  hette."  and  "dass  der  Staat  E.  C.  D.  ewig  verbunden  wehre 
vor  den  guthen  patriotischen  eyffer "     B.  St.  A. 

Schmettau  writes,  May  1689,  that  Shrewsbery  told  him,  "Nous 
reconnoissons  fort  bien,  qu'apres  le  Roy  c'est  S.  A,  E.  de  Branden- 
bourg  qui  nous  sauve."    B.  St.  A. 

2  Dec.  28,  1688.    Cavelli,  Vol.  II,  p.  447. 


54 


ing  months ;  and  William  was  usually  ready  to  promise  to  do 
what  he  could,  and  to  hold  out  hopes  for  the  future.  Also 
Schomberg,  Dykvelt,  and  Witsen  declared  their  willingness  to 
aid  Spaen,  and  later  Schmettau,  to  secure  subsidies.  Spaen, 
however,  remained  unsuccessful. 

Frederick  was  not  less  persistent  in  his  desire  for  Schom- 
berg's  return  to  the  Continent.  He  was  considering  the  jour- 
ney to  Prussia,  and  doubtless  hoped  to  leave  the  feared  and 
respected  veteran,  in  the  Rhineland.  He  wanted  not  .only  his 
service  and  advice,  but  also  the  prestige  which  would  accrue 
to  himself.  Perhaps  he  even  thought  that  Schomberg  might 
retain  the  troops  which  he  brought  back  from  England.^  A 
more  special  reason  may  have  been  the  fact  that  while  Waldeck 
outranked  Schoning,  Schomberg  would  probably,  according  to 
the  arrangements  made  at  Wesel  in  December,  be  the  com- 
manding officer,  if  the  Dutch  and  Brandenburg  forces  formed 
a  single  army.  And  he  would  be  under  Frederick's  orders. 
Whether  or  not  William  realized  this  and  preferred  to  keep 
matters  as  they  were,  he  refused  to  enter  into  the  question  of 
Schomberg's  return.  In  any  case  the  excuse,  that  he  needed  his 
services  in  Ireland,  was  true  enough.  Frederick  also  urged 
Schomberg  himself,^  who  apparently  would  have  preferred 
service  in  Germany.    But  the  decision  remained  with  William. 

Some  further  matters  were  taken  up  by  Spaen.  In  par- 
ticular Frederick  hoped  to  convince  William  of  his  steadfast- 
ness, and  to  secure  his  influence  for  the  protection  of  Cleves, 
and  other  undertakings.  The  best  method  of  securing  the  sup- 
port of  Denmark,  without  offending  Sweden,  became  the  sub- 
ject of  much  discussion  after  the  beginning  of  February. 


1  Instructions  for  Spaen,  Jan.  8.  He  is  to  urge  upon  Orange  "die 
Englische  nation  nicht  allein  zu  eine  Kriegs  Declaration  wieder  Frank- 
reich  bestens  zu  disponieren  sondern  auch  eine  erkleklichen  theil  Ihre 
aus  diesen  Provincien  nach  England  mitgenommenen  trouppen  unter 
des  Marschales  de  Schomberg  commando  wieder  zuruck  anher  zusen- 
den."    B.  St.  A. 

2  Frederick  to  Schomberg,  Jan.  3,  1689.    Concept  in  B.  St.'  A. 


55 


The  instructions  of  Schmettau  contain  the  same  demands, 
tho  more  earnestly  expressed.  Great  emphasis  is  placed  upon 
Frederick's  services,^  and  his  need  of  subsidies  ^  and  of 
Schomberg.  He  was,  besides,  to  seek  the  speedy  consumma- 
tion of  an  alliance,  between  England,  Brandenburg,  and  the 
Netherlands,  guaranteeing  Frederick  complete  reimbursement 
for  all  damages.  The  above  mentioned  propositions  in  regard 
to  the  Stadtholdership,  and  the  relations  with  Denmark,  form 
considerable  portions  of  his  instructions.  As  to  subsidies  for 
Denmark,  he  was  to  move  very  cautiously  until  Brandenburg 
had  been  provided  for.  With  certain  of  these  points,  and 
their  statement,  Waldeck  expressed  disapproval.  He  did  not 
believe  that  the  time  had  come  to  discuss  an  alliance,  or  that 
such  an  alliance  should  contain  special  guarantee  for  Branden- 
burg. Especially,  he  objected  that  Frederick  seemed  to  de- 
mand aid,  because  of  what  he  had  done  for  Orange,  when  as  a 
matter  of  fact  he  had  acted  for  his  own  interest.^  This  last 
point  Frederick  was  forced  in  part  to  admit.  The  question  of 
the  Stadtholdership  does  not  seem  to  have  been  mentioned  to 
Waldeck,  nor  does  it  enter  into  Schmettau's  formal  memorial 
on  the  points  of  his  instruction.* 

As  far  as  can  be  judged,  William's  attitude  was  much  the 
same  as  that  of  Waldeck.     He  was  much  interested  in  the 


1  "Es  wehre — bekandt — wie  gerne  und  willig  wir  mit  underlas- 
sungen  der  trouppen  wie  auch  mit  unserem  bey  Braunschweig-Zelle 
und  Hessen-Cassel  angewandten  officiis  alles  was  in  unserem  vermogen 
gewesen  dazur  contribuirt." 

2  "Das  f  urnembste  aber  worauf  er  seine  gedanken  und  bemuh- 
ungen  zu  richten  ist  dass  wir  einige  geld  subsidien  von  England 
erhalten." 

3  Schmettau  writes,  from  the  Hague,  Mar.  14/24,  that  Waldeck 
said,  "Muste  man  die  principien  allerzeit  nehmen,  dass  jeder  von  der 
guten  Parthey  umb  seines  eignen  interesse  willen  und  nicht  andern 
zugefallen  in  den  Krieg  gegen  Frankreich  trette — Muste  man  also 
einander  die  merita  nicht  auf  rechnen  oder  grosse  obligation,  avantagen, 
und  subsidien  von  einander  deshalb  protendiren." 

4  Schmettau  to  Frederick,  May  6. 


bb 


northern  question,  because  it  needed  attention.  He  was  not 
particularly  interested  in  Frederick's  demands  for  himself,  for 
he  felt  sure  where  Brandenburg's  interest  lay,  and  that  there 
was  no  present  danger  of  an  adjustment  with  France.  It  is 
not  likely  that  the  question  of  gratitude  or  ingratitude  would 
have  greatly  mfluenced  him.^  His  own  position  and  responsi- 
bilities were  too  difficult.  But  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose 
that  he  would  have  considered  these  questions  to  be  involved. 
In  Frederick,  as  an  individual,  he  very  likely  had  never  had  any 
large  measure  of  confidence.  His  attitude  grows  less  and  less 
appreciative  as  Frederick  becomes  more  and  more  independent, 
and  useless  to  the  plans  of  the  allies.- 

Besides  the  direct  intercourse  with  Orange  and  the  Prov- 
inces, the  tendency  and  influence  of  Frederick's  other  relations 
call  for  some  notice.  They  were  all  largely  dependent  upon 
the  position  which  he  was  ready  to  take  in  the  central  problem 
of  the  year.  Opinion  has  varied  greatly  as  to  the  motives,  the 
course,  and  the  results  of  his  actions.  What  he  might  have 
accomplished,  if  he  had  centered  all  his  attention  on  one  point, 
is  of  no  great  importance.  He  felt,  wisely  or  unwisely,  that 
while  supporting  the  opposition  to  France,  he  must  also  serve 
his  special  dynastic  aims,  and  various  immediate  interests  of 
his  territories.  And  his  policy,  if  judged  at  all,  must  be  judged 
from  the  point  of  view  of  his  success  in  combining  all  his  varied 
aims.  But,  as  far  as  the  central  feature  of  the  first  months  is 
concerned,  the  simple  essential  fact  is  that  Frederick  accepted 
the  plan  of  1688.  Certainly  he  need  not  be  confined  to  a  single 
motive.  The  desire  to  appear  possessed  of  a  German  patriot- 
ism played  a  part.  How  far  Frederick  would  deliberately 
have  sacrificed  any  of  his  own  interests  in  the  interest  of  Ger- 
many does  not,  however,  appear.     There  is  no  doubt  of  his 


1  Compare  Droysen  on  William's  ingratitude. 

2  Kramer,  Archives— de  la  maison  d'Orange-Nassau,  and  van 
der  Heim,  "Archief  v.  den  Raadpensionarius  A.  Heinsius,"  have  a 
great  many  such  complaints. 


57 


anxiety  for  Protestantism.  Still,  as  the  aim  was  always  to 
keep  the  struggle  entirely  within  political  lines,  this  can  hardly 
be  said  to  come  to  the  front.  The  plain  logic  of  the  facts  seems 
to  be  that  the  Elector  and  his  advisers  saw  that  Brandenburg's 
interest  lay  in  the  support  of  the  plan  of  1688.  There  is  noth- 
ing to  give  color  to  the  idea  that  any  outside  question,  taken 
alone,  would,  or  should,  have  swayed  him.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
however,  the  interests  of  Protestantism,  of  Germany,  and  of 
Brandenburg  all  centered  about  the  struggle  with  France,  and 
Frederick's  choice  was  much  lightened  thereby. 

Having  made  his  decision,  Frederick  showed  his  willing- 
ness to  act  accordingly.  And  this  willingness  was  a  contribu- 
tion of  the  first  importance.  Still  it  was  a  contribution  differ- 
ing in  quantity,  rather  than  quality,  from  that  of  the  other 
North  German  princes.  It  differed  because  he  was  Elector  of 
Brandenburg,  because  his  lands  lay  directly  in  the  path  of 
France,  because  he  looked  upon  himself  and  his  house  as  the 
natural  successor  of  William  on  the  Continent.  But  he  was  not 
the  only  person  who  realized  the  situation,  and  had  a  vital 
interest  in  developments.  Nor  did  he  possess  the  predom- 
inance of  the  coming  Prussia.  He  was  still,  very  largely,  one 
among  his  equals, — his  jealous  equals,  all  of  whom  were  able  to 
read  the  fairly  obvious  signs  of  the  times,  and  to  act  accord- 
ingly. There  is  no  indication  that  the  basic  position  of  Hesse- 
Cassel,  of  Celle,  or  of  Hanover,  was  due  to  his  persuasion. 
But  it  was  a  time  when  everyone,  not  excepting  Frederick,  felt 
in  greater  or  less  degree  inclined  to  wait  the  course  of  events, 
to  see  where  his  neighbor  would  stand.  Here  Frederick's 
desire  to  further  the  cause  played  no  unimportant  part.  It  en- 
couraged the  other  powers  to  action,  which,  in  turn,  encouraged 
him. 

In  this  connection  the  relations  with  Hesse-Cassel  are 
worthy  of  mention.  Pufendorf  says  that,  when  the  Landgrave 
came  to  Berlin,  Frederick  cautiously  laid  the  matter  before 
him,   and   prepared   the   way   for  the   later   propositions   of 


58 


Orange.^  There  is  little  doubt  that  this  is  the  course  which 
Frederick  proposed  to  himself.  It  is  possible,  tho  hardly- 
probable,  that  he  was  left  to  believe  that  he  had  carried  it  thru. 
The  Landgrave  met  him  unexpectedly,  at  Fiirstenwalde,  on 
July  27.  On  August  1,  Gortz  signed  at  Berlin  a  memoir  on 
the  conditions,  prepared  by  Bentinck,  for  the  transfer  of 
troops  to  the  Provinces.^  As  Bentinck  was  far  from  Berlin, 
even  five  days  is  too  brief  an  interval  to  allow  for  Pufendorf 's 
story.  In  any  case  the  Landgrave  was  already  informed  of  the 
situation  by  Bentinck;  and,  very  likely,  had  some  still  earlier 
knowledge,  as  Gortz  had  been  the  secret  agent  of  Orange 
since  May.  It  may  well  be  that  the  meeting  with  his  minister 
was  fully  as  important  as  that  with  Frederick,  in  completing 
the  agreement  with  William.  Surely  the  Landgrave  and  Gortz 
were  just  as  active,  in  their  degree,  as  Frederick  and  his  ad- 
visers in  theirs.  They  doubtless  met  at  Berlin,  of  their  own 
motion,  to  feel  the  situation  there.  Encouragement  to  both 
Elector  and  Landgrave  resulted.  The  direct  outcome  was  the 
treaty  between  Brandenburg  and  Hesse-Cassel.  Indirectly  it 
may  have  facilitated  the  speedy  acceptance  of  Bentinck's  prop- 
ositions by  each  of  them.^ 

On  Frederick's  representations  to  the  Emperor,  Pufen- 
dorf also  places  considerable  emphasis.  The  agitation  of  the 
Catholic  party  falls,  somewhat,  into  two  periods,  one  before, 
the  other  after,  the  flight  of  James.  Surely  Frederick  did  what 
he  could  on  both  occasions.  But,  naturally  enough,  he  followed 
William  both  in  time  and  in  argument.  Nor  is  it  likely  that 
his  representations  had  great  importance,  compared  with  those 
of  the  Pope,  the  opinions  of  theologians,  the  direct  communica- 


1  De  rebys  Frederici,  III,  Lib.  I,  §  68. 

2  Original  in  H.   R.  A. 

8  As  a  matter  of  fact  it  is  probable  that  Pufendorf  based  his 
account  upon  a  memoir,  preserved  among  papers  at  Berlin  which  he 
certainly  used,  (B.  St.  A.  Rep.  XI,  Nr.  1}>,  Conv.  10,  F.),  in  which 
Fuchs  suggests  that  the  Landgrave  might  be  approached  by  just  the 
steps  mentioned  in  the  "Res  gestae"  as  actually  occurring. 


59 


tions  of  Orange,  the  fact  that  James  fled  to  France,  and  the 
hold  which  Leopold  knew  he  possessed,  over  Frederick,  thru 
the  "Recess"  of  1686. 

Still,  tho  William  was  not,  and  could  not  be,  dependent 
on  Frederick  even  in  his  German  negotiations,  he  recognized 
his  possible  importance.  Repeatedly  he  asked  him  to  use  his 
influence  with  Saxony,  with  Brunswick,  and  above  all  with 
Miinster.  In  fact,  tho  Bentinck  claimed  to  feel  assured  of 
Celle,  he  was  very  urgent  that  Fuchs  also  see  Bernstoff,  the 
chief  minister  of  the  Duke,  and  explain  the  position  of  Bran- 
denburg. Later  Frederick  was  prompt  to  recognize  William 
as  king,  and  in  urging  that  no  agents  of  James  be  received  at 
Regensburg  or  Vienna.  Surely  Frederick  was  not  in  a  posi- 
tion, either  politically  or  personally,  to  lead  William  or  to  guide 
his  diplomacy.  Nor  would  his  father  have  been.  Still  it  does 
not  seem  that  he  fell  into  the  position  of  a  mere  supporter  of 
William  in  Germany.  In  his  complaint  that  the  Elector  and 
his  ministers  "kamen  in  die  Lage,  die  oranischen  Unterhand- 
lungen  zu  unterstiitzen  statt  zu  leiten,"  Droysen  forgets  Wil- 
liam, his  character,  and  his  responsibilities.  He  forgets  that  it 
was  William,  not  Brandenburg,  who  could  offer  inducements, 
and  who  alone  could  utter  the  "nunc  aut  numquam."  He  fails 
to  see,  what  the  men  of  the  time  saw,  that,  hampered  by  a 
Brandenburg  bent  on  leading,  the  expedition  of  1688  could 
probably  never  have  occurred ;  and  that  Frederick  had  more  to 
gain  as  a  valuable  ally  than  in  a  futile  attempt  to  lead.  And  it 
may  be  added  that  the  Elector  had  no  intention  of  being  other 
than  at  least  an  equal  with  William,  especially  in  Germany. 
He  rapidly  shows  independence,  tho  he  found,  naturally 
enough,  that  the  rest  of  Europe  was  more  than  a  mere  set  of 
puppets. 

But,  especially,  Droysen  forgets,  for  the  moment,  that  this 
was  not  the  whole  story.  Frederick  and  his  ministers  have 
their  own  part  to  play  in  the  organization  of  German  resist- 
ance to  France.  The  plan  of  1688  was  far  reaching,  and  every- 
thing seemed  to  depend  upon  the  success  of  the  English  ex- 


60 


pedition.  But  the  time  for  building  a  general  alliance  had  not 
arrived,  and  the  whole  structure  was  a  fabric  of  separate  alli- 
ances. Orange  assured  himself  of  the  position  of  the  German 
courts,  and  drew  a  portion  of  their  troops  into  the  service  of 
the  Netherlands.  This  was  important,  but  only  a  portion  of 
the  task.  The  organization  among  the  German  princes  fell  to 
other  hands;  and  here  Frederick  and  his  ministers  played  a 
large  and  active  part.  The  reason  is  to  be  found  in  the  com- 
parative importance  of  his  power,  the  previous  alliance  with 
France,  and  present  readiness  to  turn  to  a  new  line  of  policy. 
It  is  not  to  be  found  in  willingness  on  his  part  to  sacrifice  for 
a  common  cause,  in  a  greater  insight  or  a  less.  Frederick  and 
his  advisers  were  convinced.  They  had  chosen  their  part  in 
the  struggle,  and  acted  accordingly,  picking  the  way  as  care- 
fully as  possible,  but  not  so  carefully  as  to  injure  the  cause. 
They  did  not  desire  to  hasten  their  own  break  with  France, 
and  could  not  hope  directly  to  hasten  the  offensive  of  the  allies. 
Probably,  however,  this  turned  out  for  the  best.  And  it  is 
hard  to  say  what  further  steps  should  have  been  taken,  by  the 
North  German  princes,  in  these  first  months. 

One  great  difficulty  with  historical  results  is  the  practical 
impossibility  of  properly  estimating  the  influence  of  the  per- 
sonal elements.  Still  the  real  question  should  be  whether 
Frederick  did  what  he  could  do,  not  whether  he  did  ideally 
well.  He  was  surely  not  a  man  of  exceptional  ability,  and  he 
was  in  a  very  difficult  position.  He  had  good  advisers  and 
used  them,  tho  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  decision  re- 
mained with  him.  The  plain  fact  is  that  he  accomplished  the 
immediate  task  left  him  by  his  father;  and,  in  all  probability 
as  thoroughly  as  the  latter  could  have  done.  When  all  is  said, 
it  may  be  doubted  whether  his  voice,  at  this  time,  was  not  as 
steady,  if  less  violent,  than  his  father's  would  have  been.  He 
held  back  at  times,  but  at  critical  points  he  acted ;  and,  when  he 
acted,  it  was  for  the  cause,  or  at  least  for  Brandenburg  in 
ways  which  he  did  not  consider  harmful  to  the  cause.  Bran- 
denburg's position  was  difficult,  especially  because,  while  not 


61 


always  strong  enough  to  act  as  a  great  power,  she  was  strong 
enough  to  have  the  ambition  to  do  so.  She  had  reached  a 
point  in  her  development,  where  some  temporary  sacrifices 
were  occasionally  necessary,  if  she  were  to  keep  her  position, 
and  be  ready  for  future  advance.  No  one  will  be  prepared  to 
maintam  that  the  policies,  either  of  Frederick  William  or  of 
Frederick  III,  were  always  the  wisest.  Brandenburg,  however, 
could  afford  to  wait,  and  would  probably  in  any  case  have  had 
to  wait.    Europe  could  not. 

Neither  of  the  two  Electors  were  men  of  real  singleness 
of  purpose.  The  result  has  been  that  commentators  have 
tended  to  place  their  emphasis  on  this  plan,  or  that  motive, 
and  have,  in  so  far,  failed.  x\s  to  motive,  Frederick  was  for- 
tunate in  being  faced  by  a  situation  where  the  cause  of  Prot- 
estantism, of  Europe,  of  Germany,  and  of  Brandenburg,  all 
called  for  opposition  to  Louis.  Thus  he  could  hardly  do  other- 
wise than  believe  in  the  plan  of  1688.  There  is  no  doubt  of 
his  intentions,  of  his  activity,  or  of  his  importance.  It  is  pos- 
sible that  he  might  have  furthered  the  struggle  with  France 
by  a  change  of  policy  m  one  place ;  or  have  advanced  the  more 
special  interests  of  Brandenburg  by  a  different  attitude  in  an- 
other. But  he  did  not  consider  that  he  could  afford  to  lose 
sight  of  either.  And,  in  this  first  year,  he  played  his  part  well. 
It  v/ould  be  hard  to  show  where  he  could  have  done  distinctly 
better.  But  the  role  he  chose  was  that  for  which  his  person, 
and  his  position,  was  fitted.  It  was  that  of  a  watchful  man  of 
affairs,  not  that  of  a  great  hero,  or  of  an  unscrupulous  in- 
triguer. He  was  not  a  helpless  dependent.  He  was  not  the 
soul  of  the  struggle  against  France.  He  was  the  Elector  of 
Brandenburg,  the  Duke  of  Prussia,  and  of  Cleves,  with  an 
inevitable  place  in  the  last  great  struggle  of  the  seventeenth 
century. 


LEBENSLAUF. 

Am  12.  Juni  1883  bin  ich,  Harold  Lee  King,  Sohn  des 
Universitat  Professors,  Henry  Churchill  King,  und  seiner 
Ehefrau,  in  Brecksville,  Ohio,  geboren. 

Nach  meinen  ersten  Schuljahren  studierte  ich  in  Oberlin, 
Ohio,  1901-1903,  1904-1905,  1907-1908,  und  in  Pasadena,  Cali- 
fornia, 1903-1904.  Auf  dem  Oberlin  College  habe  ich  mir  den 
Grad  A.  B.  in  1905,  und  den  Grad  A.  M.  in  1908  erworben. 
Auf  der  Harvard  Universitat  1908-1910  und  der  Universitat 
Freiburg  1912-1914  habe  ich  das  Studium  fortgesetzt.  Als 
„Associate  Professor  of  JHistory"  habe  ich  1910-1911  an  dem 
Middlebury  College,  Middlebury,  Vermont,  und  1911-1912  an 
dem  Colorado  College,  Colorado  Springs,  Colorado,  dociert. 


